One Direction Development

The long term history of development has a common theme: those who hold more power influence, if not control, the direction of development in areas where people have less power. It is the prevalent direction of development. Agents at the top make the decisions, plan the projects, and control the processes until the development is complete, at least from the viewpoint of such agents. It is no wonder, then, that those with less power are alienated, non-compliant, and at times resistant with the development that is imposed on them. This alienation leads to development projects not reaching their objectives, most often with the communities receiving the assistance but also by the standards of the more powerful agents responsible for the development projects.

Since the 1980s, there has been talk among various agents at all levels of development looking to change this ‘direction’ and involve groups that hold less power in shaping, designing and implementing development projects. When crises occur and action is needed, however, this alternative design of development is shelved for a return to the more powerful agents directing relief and assistance, and the less powerful forced to either comply or endure without assistance through the crises. When media reports on a crisis, the more powerful development agents are championed as saviors and heroes. Less powerful agents are either depicted as victims of a tragic circumstance or villains exacerbating the crisis.

A good example of this is the recent food insecurity in Niger. The press poses the question, “Is Niger ready to make the necessary changes to reduce their vulnerability to drought?” Imagery of its vastness, its emptiness, and its ‘non-productive’ land are commonly threaded into such coverage. Some accounts pressure the national government to adapt and accept the plans and programs that are written and promoted among international NGOs and other powerful agents in foreign aid. These programs, coincidentally or intentionally, resemble the agendas of multinational corporations promoting the import of foods, machinery, other products and services from overseas. While such assistance can provide a quick fix to the recent food crisis, it will also continue to undermine local food production and push Niger to fully integrate into the erratic and unstable environment of international food commodities. Nigériens have already experienced a partial immersion into such markets. The drop in uranium prices and the inevitable spiral of debt from World Bank loans set them up for the famines in the 1980s when drought returned. Local food production was already retarded from export-led development policies the Nigérien government pursued from 1960 through the 1980s. Today the Nigérien government complies with international aid agencies’ agendas, but many Nigériens do not. There are cases of individuals who comply and profit from external aid, those who are hostile to development agents and programs, while most Nigériens abstain from assistance programs for various reasons.

Niger is not alone in this one-way dilemma of development. In other crises, both natural and human-induced, the opportunity to drive Sub-Saharan nations further into global market integration is masked by assistance, the goal of sustainability and empowering Africans. Images of heroic efforts by donors and international organizations fill the headlines, as does the portrait of saving a primitive people from a harsh landscape. Somalia and the Sudan are obvious examples. Aid workers on the ground are however many times unaware of the power relations their agencies have, and surprised if not shocked when local people do not welcome their presence.

At a time when we recognize that humans are responsible for the destruction of local ecologies, contributing to a changing global climate, and reducing biodiversity and the diets of so many peoples across the globe, is it not in the best interest to empower African communities through the promotion of local food production? There are products and foods in an international arena that have their purpose and place in Africa, particularly when food crises change into famines. But the infusion of global food commodities into local Africa markets should not be the end goal of development agents, who through good or Machiavellian intentions, are further eroding the mechanisms that are needed to make Niger and other African nations food secure.

Upcoming Fragmentation of the Sahara and Sahel

Libyan Dinar with Muammar Kaddafi

Muammar Kaddafi and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the heads of state for Libya and Algeria respectively, have played upon the poverty and divisions among Tuareg communities both within their own countries and to the south of them (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) for decades as a means to keep their countries stable and to destabilize their neighbors. Kaddafi’s and Bouteflika’s meddling into Tuareg society for their own political gains, however, was one of many policies that overlooked the greater problem of dissatisfaction that many Libyans and Algerians have with their governments today.

The chronic problems of high unemployment rates, rising costs of food and other living expenses, and the effective dictatorship in both countries inspired many Libyans and Algerians to take to the streets and demand regime change. Now that this has turned into turmoil for Libya and an expected future crisis for Algeria, these governments are once again exploiting the situation of poverty and state alienation that Tuaregs experience in other countries to the South. Algeria is silently supporting the Kaddafi regime through transporting Tuareg young men from their Saharan territory, but also Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso to Libya. They have also facilitated the deployment of former Tunisian sharpshooters that killed people in the streets of Tunis, Sfax and Bizerte, and, military cadres of the Polisario, the Western Saharan independence movement that was ignored too long by regional and superpowers over the past ten years. Bouteflika has taken these actions in the hopes that Kaddafi will regain his country and the grassroots protests that affected Libya can be averted in Algeria.

In the meantime, Kaddafi encourages young Tuareg men to fight alongside his loyalists and mercenaries through the economic incentive of 10000 USD at enlistment and an additional 1000 USD for each day of fighting. It is believed that such an offer has attracted 2300 Tuareg, coming not only from southwest Libya but also Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The payment of 23 million plus will not make a dent in Kaddafi’s family assets, which are estimated at 117 billion. It will, however, destabilize the Sahara and Sahel despite what happens to Kaddafi. Rumors are already circulating that Kaddafi and his family are looking to exit Libya, which would very likely leave his paid mercenaries at the hands of mob justice. How the opposition, the Islamic Councils that run eastern Libya at the moment, would receive the Tuareg communities if they were to take power over the entire country is another major concern, considering Tuareg participation with the loyalists against the opposition.

The greater problem from my perspective, however, rests with the arming and organizing of young Tuareg men to fight in Libya. Win or lose, these men are going to return to Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, most likely with their arms and ambitions of striking back against Bamako, Niamey, and perhaps, Ouagadougou. Money does not solve the crises of poverty and alienation that the Tuareg have experienced for so long in the Sahel. It only brings incentives to start new insurgencies against states that have ignored their northern territories for decades. In a worse case scenario, these Tuareg fighters will organize and strike military installments at home leading once again to rebellions and violence. Although, strategies could detour because of previous experience by limiting their actions to banditry and kidnappings, what has occurred during the Global War on Terror for the past eight years in mostly the Sahara, and with a few incidents, in the Sahel. I do not doubt that early on in the Libyan crisis, Tuareg communities sympathized with the Libyans protesters. The Tuareg, after all, voice similar grievances with their national leaders. Poverty and petrodollars, however, have brought people with similar experiences into opposite trenches. One can only hope that Kaddafi abandons Libya as soon as possible before too many die in combat and animosities grow deep between the Tuareg and the Libyans wanting political change.

Translated, the title reads: “The Western Powers call for Bouteflika to step down,” and

Bouteflika says, “I don’t care, if they pull (shoot), I shoot back!”

When the Global War on Terror Becomes a Global War on Democracy

Flag of the former monarchy in Libya 1951-1969



What do the tragic events currently taking place in Libya and the United States/European Union’s Global War On Terror (GWOT) have in common? … possibly the special commandos and foreign mercenaries that Kaddafi has unleashed on the large, peaceful protesters that had little choice but fight back in Zwara, Misratah and Benghazi. Please allow me to explain.

What the Global War on Terror and the fragmenting state of Libya might possibly have in common are the soldiers coming to the aid of Mummar Qaddafi, the aging leader of Libya for over 40 years now. There are the obvious loyalists of Qaddafi who possibly have received preferential treatment during his rule. These are not the link. Instead, there are various reports from Al Jazeera and other news agencies of Black African special commandos and foreign mercenaries coming from Niger, Chad and as far away as Zimbabwe. This should not be a surprise. Qaddafi for the past couple of decades has been showering West and Central African states with philanthropy in order to create a better position for Libya in the African Union and also in the larger geopolitical arena.

Now that his regime faces collapse, he is certainly calling on those countries to assist him with soldiers and equipment and what certainly is a part of his persuasiveness, rewarding these states and soldiers handsomely with beaucoup d’argent. Brace yourself because here comes the punch line. These forces that Qaddafi has called upon and are protecting him now … the ones coming from at least Niger and Chad, wearing ‘yellow hats’ by Al Jazeera’s accounts, and speaking French among each other as they hunt down protesters in Libyan cities to shoot, kill and rape may very well be the forces trained by US and European Special Forces to fight terrorism in the Sahara and Sahel. Surprise! Just like the tear gas canisters that were made in the USA and thrown into the crowds of thousands that assembled in Tahrir Square neighborhood of Cairo, Egypt, Western Nations have, once again, contributed to needless violence against a genuine democratic movement.

Before writing angry letters to Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, and Madrid, let me clarify something. If my theory rings true and these special forces Qaddafi is using to save himself and his cronies are, in fact, the same soldiers trained by US and European Special Forces in GWOT, then we must be fair to our short-sighted politicians. It was certainly not their intentions to train soldiers to protect Qaddafi’s dictatorship. That was not then, and not now, their goal. They did intend, however, on supporting the weak democracies and brutal dictatorships that exist in West and Central Africa. After all, these are their allies against terrorism, or at least they designate these regimes as their GWOT allies.

The major problem with GWOT is it has failed in its efforts to reduce violence in the Sahara and Sahel. In fact, it has increased the number of violent incidents. In our efforts to train the national militaries in West and Central Africa, we (Americans and Europeans) have provided West and Central African regimes the tools and training to suppress their political rivals, and, more importantly, their own citizenry. Meanwhile kidnappings and attacks on Western interests have increased since September 11th. Meanwhile, flukes and unintended consequences like Qaddafi calling upon US and European trained special forces from Niger and Chad have found a market for their skills by protecting a brutal dictator, who by conservative estimates, has killed over 300 of his citizenry (some of them while attending the funerals of Libyans that were killed earlier).

One last rant (this one is especially for the Governor Walker of Wisconsin and new members of the US Congress). At a time when you are claiming it is in America’s best interest to give up what few social safety nets they have, cut their wages and benefits, and scrap any future efforts at collective bargaining, do you think it is in your best interests to keep shoveling funds into failed military programs like GWOT while cutting what little benefits Americans have at home? … (GWOT) funds that inadvertently undermine real, democratic, social change organized by peaceful Libyans, Egyptians and Tunisians? Or will you wrap a terrorist label around these people as you cut the modest benefits of teachers, fire fighters, janitors, and other public employees? And if this was not enough, you also want to strip them of their rights to assemble, strike and bargain? I don’t want to be cynical about this, but it truly looks like GWOT and the agendas of politicians for 2011 are really just fronts for a Global War on Democracy both at home and abroad.

Flag for the Libyan Protesters of 2011