Vulnerability Does Not Happen Overnight

It is unfortunate what is happening in the central and eastern Sahel (IRIN News, “Mali: Pockets of Extreme Vulnerability Still Persist” http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=90522). This is not the first time, however, that Sahelian countries have endured chronic drought and long periods of desiccation. In the past 100 years, drought affected the interior of West Africa during 1911-1914, 1927-1928, 1931-1932, 1940-1941, 1968-1974, 1983-1985, 2005 and now in 2010. The Russian and Levant droughts and other extremities like the floods in Pakistan this year are signs of an approaching change in climatic events in areas like Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. A question remains if these and the regions within them are prepared for the demographic changes that will accompany such extreme shifts in climate.

The Sahel is not. Sahelian communities have lived with vulnerability in both good and bad years for decades. The article mentioned above is reporting on an immediate crisis and not on the chronic problems that have manifested into a long-term susceptibility to food shortages, malnutrition and famine. In the realm of academia Michael Watts’s book, “Silent Violence” and Alex de Waal’s work in the Sudan have showed the factors (both internal and external) that manifest into debt and dependency during good times and later exacerbate a crisis like food shortages and famines when natural or man-made disasters strike. In my reading of the IRIN news story I found points that omit information and need addressing, not just by spectators (like I am for the moment) but by policy makers and aid workers on the ground in the Sahel.

First, the above citied article makes an assumption that pastoral groups can subsist on the milk of their animals for an undefined period as long as pasture is adequate. This may hold true for part of the year, but to subsist exclusively on milk is a practice only able-bodied adults can manage for moderate periods. In pastoral societies, adults who are fit enough will live exclusively off of milk: ranging from a few weeks to extreme cases of five months out of the year. Malnutrition will become evident first in children and later in others the longer grain products are unobtainable. Pastoralists have always had a dependency on neighboring agricultural communities and any retardation of rice, millet and sorghum harvests affects their food security.

Second, the article talks of “…extreme stress as the preharvest lean season continues,” when discussing sedentary, farming communities. Periods of stress exist for all groups dependent on natural resources each year but their ‘lean seasons’ are usually not identical. Generally for the northern Sahel farmers experience the hardest of times at the start of the cold season (September to November). It is when granaries are emptying and work is essential to ensure a successful harvest. April through June is the saison soudure for pastoralists. This is the end of the hot-dry season when pasture is exhausted, an animal’s value drops significantly at the markets and drawing water from the wells becomes crucial and a contest for herd survival. Fisherman experience difficulties at the height of the rainy season (August-October) as catches are difficult and meager due to the recharging of rivers and other large bodies of water.

Third, the article acknowledges the efforts the Malian government and aid agencies are making to subsidize grain prices but omits the constant competition between local grain production and the imported staples and aid that is dumped on African markets in good years and times of crises (see a previous blog here entitled, “Food Aid Convention [FAC] in Madrid, Spain,” posted February 02, 2009). The consequence of importing grain which is encouraged by agencies like the International Grains Council is the retardation of local food production. Since farmers have to compete with imports the incentive for them and their children is not to continue farming but to seek out other income opportunities. The younger generations are not well represented among the local food producers in Tombouctou, Gao and Kidal (the three provincial towns mentioned in the article) and who can blame them?  They migrate to urban environments at home or abroad and enter into wage-labor opportunities that at first are lucrative but are dependent on a booming global economy. Problem: we have been in a global recession since 2008. In fact, Mali was one of the first countries to experience spikes in unemployment. Thus the subsidized prices, while a blessing to some, will only be an insult to young people who are out of work and struggling to return to their families to assist them in raising and harvesting the crops by December.

Fourth and perhaps the greatest tragedy, is urgency the article makes to find seasonal or temporary employment opportunities for agro-pastoralists living along or near the Niger River without any mention as to what type of work. To offer agro-pastoralists work opportunities like what their counterparts found in the urban environments is the same dependency treadmill that has brought Mali once again to the brinks of a food crisis. The global economy will continue to go through boom and bust cycles and when they are abandoned once more the effects of neglected local food production will be evident. In my opinion this is an excellent time for Mali and other Sahelian nations to use these labor pools to develop water infrastructure so that river water, ground water and temporary sources can be utilized in local food production. It is a chance to improve roads so food transport costs drop. The government and aid agencies need to pool their resources in order to offer wages, food and other incentives to these vulnerable groups to improve such infrastructures. It is a chance for these intelligent young people who lost their jobs in France, Bamako and Abidjan to return to Tombouctou, Gao and Kidal and apply their skills at tillage, pest management, and nutrient management. To offer locals a participatory role in improving local natural resources is a vital step in promoting food security.

In conclusion given the extremities in climate change happening across the globe, this article will likely reappear in the near future with a different title, a different set of people interviewed, but the same underlying message, “The Sahel needs help!” This is a true statement but the omission of long-term factors that amplified this vulnerability does not expedite a solution. It only perpetuates the story of Africans victims of their climate when in truth they are constrained by political, social and economic forces that retard local food production. Food producers, whether they are farmers, herders or fishermen experience tough times, be they seasonal or generational, but this does not mean they must abandon what independence they have for towns, wage labor, and imported foodstuffs. Subsidizing food prices and distributing food aid has its place but to constantly commit to this in ‘bad times’ and ignore the systematic problems occurring even when the rains are adequate is an injustice. New work opportunities should be directed at projects that encourage local food production and not directly and indirectly promote the importation of food. To bring back incentives for local farmers to produce will have ripple effects regarding reductions in illegal immigration and proper stewardship over natural resource management. Committing to a gradual withdrawal of grain imports on Africa’s markets will help but policy makers also must simultaneously encourage the local production of agriculture, animal husbandry and fishing. To empower a local food producer in Africa is to take a healthy direction in long-term food security.

Still Thinking ‘Inside the Box’

Source: FEWS Net

With famine again threatening the Sahel region, the same time-worn and flawed responses to the looming crisis appear to be in the making. According to Nigerien government (IRIN news reporting), 50% of its population (7 million) at risk of famine in its central and eastern parts and Chad is reporting 20% (2 million) are at the same levels of vulnerability in the central and northern parts of its territory. Updates from FEWS (Famine Early Warning Systems) verifies these reports as a belt of high to extreme food insecurity stretches from eastern Mali to western Sudan (see the image above). The media interviews officials at national agencies in an effort to find solutions. These officials urge NGOs and wealthy nations to provide immediate food aid and long-term assistance to their agricultural, livestock and irrigation sectors. Once again by thinking ‘inside the box,’ expectations rest on the central government to be the gatekeeper and manager of external aid as was the case with the droughts and famines of the 1970s and 1980s. This reliance on external donations and national governments to individually manage their own food crises accomplishes little to end food insecurity in the region, however.

Solutions are obviously not easy or immediate. But there are two realities that are under reported and need greater attention. One is the growing conditions of regional climate change and how this will affect the area. With greater extremities of weather, particularly drought and flooding, land use and migration patterns will need greater flexibility and promotion by West African states. Regional opportunities for temporary work and migration to bordering states are needed to allow vulnerable groups to stave off future crises. This is a tactic that local populations, particularly nomadic pastoralists, adjusted for in the past but the creation of arbitrary borders and confinement of populations through border closures and discrimination have retarded the fluidity that West Africans once engaged in to feed their families and maintain their livelihoods.

The other is allowing local populations to manage their natural resources. The policy of decentralization is promoted by many international actors including non-governmental organizations, bilateral and multilateral agencies. Decentralization is the process of the central state transferring various powers of development and natural resource management to local communities. Most West African states have balked on passing decision making powers and releasing the needed funds for development projects to the local level. There are obviously concerns over defining representatives and dividing powers fairly among two or more groups who share the same natural resource(s). These concerns are not justification for dismissing the goal of decentralization, however. Central governments in the Sahel have made few steps towards overcoming these obstacles and implementing decentralization in the region.

Where the national level can have a participatory role in ending food insecurity is in eradicating laws relating to food production that conflict and cancel out one another and eliminate the competition that exists between different bureaus. In addition, Sahelian governments must promote agendas that maintain natural resources and are complimentary to stable food production. To do so, the central government will have to play a pragmatic arbiter to the diverse populations it represents instead of heavy-handed patriarch. The stalemate of the national government overseeing and controlling natural resources while maintaining a top-down approach to development is not working to improve agriculture, steward pasture and manage water resources. Even if the food aid arrives delivery will be late as much as five months in the more remote Sahel. Crops have already failed, livestock is dying, seed banks are empty, and pasture is depleted. The region has prolonged its risk of food insecurity for too long by relying on the central government to solve this issue. There must be greater cooperation not only at the national level but also the regional and local. Giving West Africans a significant stake in the land they inhabit is the first step.

The 1990s Malian Rebellion

I recently had a conversation with a former aid worker in Mali. The dialogue was quite informative as this person resided and worked there for ten years from the conclusion of the 1980s famine to the end of the 1990s rebellion. As a foreigner he/she found the actions taken by some Tamasheq individuals during these crises as irrational and ungrateful regarding the presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It is understandable to have such reactions considering this person was there to help, particularly the Tamasheq who had more vulnerability than most in the droughts and revolt. His/her thoughts however showed little understanding regarding the Tamasheq grievances and actions during these events.

The first situation explained by the former aid worker involved the start of the rebellion. Much literature uses 1990 as the starting point. It is actually difficult to assign when the Malian Rebellion actually began considering the fighting was not so much conventional warfare. Hit and run tactics were used by the rebel factions while the Malian military patrolled during the day. According to this source, however, it started in Ménaka in 1989, an eastern sub-prefecture town 1502 km from Bamako and where I conducted a fair amount of my research in 2006-2008. Rebels had descended on the town during the day and caught many by surprise, killing ten soldiers and one aid worker that worked for the narrator’s organization. Some of my interviewees confirmed this but more important, this was the start of an estranged relationship between many NGO workers and Arab/Tamasheq groups in during the Malian Rebellion.

The narrator had a personal experience with two individuals perceived to be rebels. Early on in the revolt he/she had been approached by two Tamasheq, one of which brandished a pistol. The gun was placed at his/her head and it was apparent to the narrator that the assailants wanted his/her vehicle: a new Toyota Land Cruiser parked right in front of them. He/she offered the keys but this was not good enough. The two men insisted he/she came along with them under the threat of death if he/she refused.

All of them climbed into the Land Cruiser and sped away. The one assailant who took the wheel drove as fast as he could without slowing down for the check post at the edge of town. The gendarme at the post apparently flashed his gun but never took a shot. The NGO worker pleaded with his/her abductors to stop and let him/her out by explaining the mission of the organization and the importance it had on ordinary Tamasheq people. To no avail they did not stop but instead raced through the sands. At about 15 km out of Gao, the driver finally stopped the Land Cruiser and the other with the pistol ordered the narrator of the story out.

The story did not end there. Apparently the vehicle was spotted at another relief camp weeks later in Mauritania thousands of kilometers away, by an aid worker who knew the narrator and the vehicle. The appearance of the vehicle had not changed much except for the fact that the Malian license plates had been removed from the bumpers and placed on the dash.

The third experience involved the negotiations and assistance the Malian government and NGOs offered the ex-combatants after the rebellion. The aid worker traveled to Kidal (1539 km from Bamako in northeastern Mali) to conduct a needs and assessment evaluation. Since the Malian government conducted a war of attrition in the North, expectations were high for implementing programs of food aid and child relief programs. Instead, however, the only programs that were popular with the ex-combatants were work projects and small enterprise loans. This was part of how NGOs contributed to the disarmament and reconciliation between the rebels and the Malian government.

These incidents were seen by the narrator with anger, confusion, and frustration. As an aid worker, he/she viewed their mission as non-partisan, democratic, and beneficial to all Malians including the Tamasheq. This, however, was not the case. NGOs are structured much like central governments where decisions and revenue allocation is a top-down approach. Since NGOs are based in the capitals and constantly under the auspices of the national government, they can often unknowingly play into the agendas and biases of political elites. In this case educated members from the Bambara ethnic group occupied national bureaus, and were well-seated to take advantage of NGO employment opportunities and influence project implementation. This was further exacerbated by the ‘Africanization’ of NGO management. NGOs since 1982 have been replacing Westerners in lower and higher management positions with African counterparts. Once again in Mali, the Bambara had larger advantages over other ethnic groups, particularly the Tamasheq who have seen the Bambara having greater opportunities and interfering in their territories since the arrival of the French in the early 1900s.

The death of the NGO worker in Ménaka was unfortunate. The narrator who told me this story did not elaborate on whether the worker was just in the wrong place – wrong time or if his death was deliberate. If it was the later, it would be safe to assume the worker was likely to have come from Bamako and the Bambara ethnic group (many did at this point of time). The narrator of this story would not have made this observation nor seen it as important. For him/her the mission of the worker was to help and assist the local community be they Tamasheq or other ethnic groups. This however has not always been the case in Bambara – Tamasheq relations as stories of discrimination, harassment and even sexual assaults on Tamasheq women have been periodic and circulating among Tamasheq encampments for decades. Furthermore the little to no representation of Tamasheq peoples in national government and NGOs was one of the rebels’ grievances at this period. It is still one that is voiced today in Mali.

The abduction of the narrator and carjacking was also unfortunate but this was another area of misunderstanding. Whether the two men were rebels or not is the first point that needs deconstruction. The rebellion was a difficult time; more for the non-participants than it was for the military or rebels. The combatants after all possessed the guns and could forcibly requisition whatever they needed or wanted. Victims of such scenarios included Tamasheq men and women who had no involvement in the rebellion. The men themselves could have been desperate or possibly taking advantage of the situation itself. Still, as the narrator assumed, they could have been rebels themselves.

The aid worker did not want to go with the men and did not understand why they were so insistent that he/she come yet dropped him/her off after driving 15 km from Gao. Living in this part of Africa for some time now, I believe I understand why it was important for the abductee to accompany them for a short time. If it had been the two Tamasheq men by themselves, there would have been no hesitation by the gendarme to open fire at them, particularly since they were speeding by with no effort to slow down or stop in the midst of a Tamasheq rebellion. But because there was a Westerner in the vehicle with the two men, the check post guard hesitated. This was the carjackers insurance policy.

The final situation where the aid worker traveled to Kidal must have been disappointing. I say this because in my talk with him/her there was a hope of helping women and children who were certainly the greater victims of the rebellion. Instead the only assistance given was to the men, the ex-combatants, themselves. The national government was not likely to change this agreement simply because they wanted peace. Bamako did not have the funds to continue suppressing the rebellion and were undergoing some rapid changes themselves. The narrator of the story had to settle in the hope of a trickledown effect from the work and microcredit projects given to the men somehow assisting women and children indirectly. He/she had no control over this gender inequality but had no choice but to carry through with it simply because peace was needed and some assistance to the local communities is better than none. Perhaps trepidation had set in at this point recognizing that top-down approaches had failed in making the Tamasheq Malians before the rebellions and NGOs, though well-intentioned, have only reinforced inequality between different groups. Like other places across the globe, power relations consistently are abused on all scales, be it globally, in a modern African state, or even at the household level.