Pastoral Food Security in the Sahara/Sahel

Sketches from Francis Nicolas

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Wed, 24 Jun 2009 02:33:00 +0000

Francis Nicholas was a French colonial administrator who spent a considerable amount of time in the region around Tahoua, Niger, traveling through the valley of Azawagh and other parts of the Tamesna (the customary pasture for many Tamasheq groups). He wrote an ethnography called Tamesna: Les Ioulemmenden de l’Est ou Touareg « Kel Dinnik » (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale), 1950. The work itself is but a sample of all the information he gathered regarding the society of the Kel Dinnik and does not contain many of the sketches he made traveling through the Tamesna in 1944 when employed by the colonial service. I post them here for those interested in the views of these villages back in the 1940s. The source is in French: Documentation Française, Notes et Documents 2112 (Dossier 02).

Food Aid Convention [FAC] in Madrid, Spain

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Mon, 02 Feb 2009 14:05:00 +0000

The rice grown along the Niger River in Mali is extraordinary in its quality and nutritional value. Anyone aware of this local produced grain can identify the rice from others as the grains are short and have a pinkish hue. Locals are aware of the high nutritional value and the rice is easily available during the cold season, November through March. The price of locally grown rice during this season is 40% lower than its imported counterparts coming from Pakistan and China and rice both local and imported are the same price during the hot-dry season of April through July. Only in July through October is the locally grown rice more expensive as the granaries empty and scarcity raises the price.

With such advantages one would expect Malian rice producers to be fairing well in income and locals eating well. This is hardly the case. The communities along the Niger River are a mixed patchwork of struggling cultivators, individuals working in the service sector and small elite involved in the import-export business with malnourishment a reality affecting a number of families both rich and poor. Despite the positive qualities of local rice production many residents prefer to spend more money during the cold season and prepare the imported rice for their families. When conducting my research I often asked families why they preferred the Chinese and Pakistani imported rice over their local rice. Two responses were common. People complained that the local rice was either too ‘heavy’ in taste or that only poor people consume the locally produced rice.

Last week the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and donor countries responsible for food aid met in Madrid, Spain from January 26th-28th to discuss the future role of food aid on a global scale. Called the Food Aid Convention or FAC, the meeting was held to approach two major concerns: the food price crisis of 2008, and for 2009 and following years to come a set of rules regarding the appropriate type of food aid and which circumstances merit food assistance. Basically FAC is trying to do more with less and with a number of agencies working at the same goals and/or competing for a shrinking resource base, the convention assembled as a means to set an agenda and parameters for participants.

This is nothing new or revolutionary for governments and aid organizations. Often the neediest and most destitute receive no aid as violence and/or difficulty in transportation retards aid workers’ efforts to distribute aid evenly. At times the political climate can affect the distribution of food aid as national governments may refuse distribution as local militias/rebels may benefit from such operations. The crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo with the Lord’s Resistance Army is one example of where politics stifles food assistance and other forms of aid and civilians receive no assistance. Furthermore, corruption is both a reality and obstacle as food donations are often sold off to merchants in major cities and trucked to local stores for purchase, though labeled as “Not for Resale.”

FAC since the late 1960s has acknowledged the difficulties of food aid and does not ensure that assistance will reach the neediest groups or countries. But as it tightens its fiscal belt and focuses more on areas of vulnerability and potential food insecurity instead of crisis, I implore those in attendance at FAC to implement policies that promote local food production (rice cultivation along the Niger River as one example) instead of creating markets for imports as has happened with past assistance. With groups such as the International Grains Council having influence in FAC over the past three decades, however, I will remain skeptical of food aid’s benevolent hand until I see more Malians eating their own locally cultivated rice.

« Ajébhah » and its Impact on the Community of Takanmba, Mali

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Sat, 17 Jan 2009 23:39:00 +0000

Source: Ministère des travaux publics et des transports de la République Française, Institut Géographique National, Dakar, 1961
UTM Projection; Clark 1880 Ellipsoid

I learned this community’s history thanks to some displaced herders living in Gao in late 2006. One of them, a customary chief of a Tuareg fraction was visiting Gao during my interviews and between his narrative, the interviews of other ex-residents of Takanmba and my archival research conducted in October 2008 in France, I was able to piece together the events that shaped this community and then divided it during the rebellion of the 1990s.

Bordering the banks of the Niger River and located at 16° 59’ 50” N; 0° 57’ 25” W, Takanmba, Mali is a local administration unit in the Department of Bourèm; Region of Gao. Its origins are rooted in the historical background I posted in my last blog, Tuareg Hostility towards a Central Authority, as an Arab trader interested in trading with nomadic groups built a house in the area. His heritage and mother tongue assured him connections to the Kounta herders circulating the territory and his proximity to the Niger River assured other prospective Fulani and Tuareg clients to pass his store in the dry season to water their animals. The community grew, first with support from the Kounta and later with the French administration. The place was originally called El Sheikh, after the founder but as more groups moved into the community and the majority became Tuareg, the name gradually changed to Takanmba.

Harmony was not always the norm between groups. Ethnic rivalry between the Kountas and certain Tuareg groups like the Chérifan and Oulliminden were the most intense, particularly up until World War I. Tension also existed between different occupations as merchants came into conflict with herders and cultivators over the exchanges of animals and grains for goods. But given Takanmba’s proximity to the Niger River, the French were able to maintain security and order in the town from the 1900s until the end in colonial rule in 1960. They viewed Soudan Français as the breadbasket to the territories part of Afrique Occidental Française and promoted the cultivation of rice along the river. Takanmba grew as Songhaï and Bella Bella [former vassals of the Tuareg and also known as Tamasheq Noire in French] moved into the area to plant rice and peace was assured by the French garrison installed at the bank of the river.

The land for centuries was a customary water source for herders’ animals during the dry season and pasture-water source during droughts. Now, the area had transformed into a large settlement with the installation of merchants and farmers. Outside its limits herding remained the primary activity but Takanmba had become an island of commerce, farming, and later education as the French built a school after World War II. Herders knew of the benefits of education as they had seen other Africans from the southern part of Soudan Français in the military and administration of the colony. Some families chose to settle with their herds on the outskirts of town in order to send some if not all their children to school with the hopes that they would have a secure future in the government or armed forces.

The population of Takanmba swelled with the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s. Herders in the northern regions of Mali, whether they abandoned pastoralism altogether or if they used Takanmba as a center for feeding and watering their herds while seeking out temporary jobs or assistance moved into the town. This placed strains on Takanmba’s infrastructure and natural resources. The farmers living in the town for generations were running into conflicts with herders using the river water to maintain their animals or into conflicts with other farmers [new or settled] who competed for land and water as the Niger River diminished in size and volume. But by the late 1980s, the conflict over natural resources was subsiding as rains returned in the northern regions and water levels of the Niger returned to pre-drought measurements.

Disaster hit Takanmba before farmers had the chance to restock their granaries, before herders had accomplished regaining their flocks and before merchants had debtors pay back their credit from the droughts. The rebellion of 1990-1996, known as « Ajébhah » in the Tamasheq language, was not the first rebellion in post-colonial Mali. Groups in the north rebelled against Bamako’s authority in the 1960s over a tax imposed on the exploitation of wood and also after the 1970s drought but these incidents were small in scale and short-lived. The rebellion of 1990-1996 was large in scale affecting the northern and eastern parts of Mali, initially well-organized [though it deteriorated into factionalism and anarchy after a couple of years], and destructive for some communities like Takanmba.

Bamako’s hold on communities north and east of Tombouctou was weak at best and as the rebel cause divided over purpose and tactics, communities like Takanmba were left vulnerable to banditry, theft and killing by various actors. Accounts of the rebels or bandits posing as rebels commandeering peoples’ animals by force were numerous and those who refused were often beaten to submission. Eight people were killed in such confrontations. For some in the town this was evidence of how ineffective the Malian military was in small towns. People started to migrate to larger towns up the river like Mopti and Ségou where security was more reliable. The Ganda Koï, a vigilante group armed themselves with anything from assault rifles to batons, organized to protect communities living along the Niger River and passed through towns like Takanmba periodically. Their purpose was to maintain order where the Malian government had weak holds but their tactics often shifted into harassing local groups that had the same heritage as rebels, i.e. the Arabs and Tamasheq. The Malian army occupied with operations in the countryside had little means to stop this abuse and more people fled Takanmba. On the eve of the rebellion the town was home to four different Tuareg groups, Arabs and Songhaï. Within the Tuareg there were the Tamasheq Rouge (Imerat) and three different types of Tamasheq Noire fractions (Iborlitan, Tagharlifit and Chamamach). At the end of 1994 the only groups that remained in Takanmba were the Songhaï, a few Imerat and families from another Tamasheq Noire group, the Igelhad, who moved from the countryside into the town due to the greater instability and violence occurring north of the area.

For most of my interviewees the rebellion had little impact or was a nuisance to their routines [circulation for herders was difficult if not impossible in several regions]. For some of them confronting drought with little means to maintain their herds and selling their animals for pittances, or, famine impacting their families and reducing the number of eligible income providers in a household during the 1970s and 1980s was more devastating than the bullets coming from rebels’ and soldiers’ guns. For all of them, both those who lost their livelihoods or family members during the political violence and those affected by environmental/economic crises, what mattered was the vulnerability they faced before these shocks; a phenomena that Michael Watts appropriately titles in his work on food security in the Hausa States of Northern Nigeria and Southern Niger “A Silent Violence.” One must put aside the low numbers of herders impacted by the rebellion as it would be unjust to let the story of Takanmba and those displaced herders living in Gao remain untold.

Tuareg Hostility towards a Central Authority

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Tue, 30 Dec 2008 22:24:00 +0000

Taken from Boubou Hama, 1967, Recherche sur l'histoire des touaregs sahariens et soudanais [Présence Africaine, Paris].

This is an excerpt of research I undertook at the Centre Archives d’Outre Mer in Aix-en-Provence, France in October of this year. Thanks to this opportunity, my dissertation will include background regarding France’s colonial policies and their influence on food security among pastoralists in the regions of Gao and Ménaka, Mali where the majority of my interviews took place. I have Dr. Brent McCusker to thank for this opportunity as he helped me with logistics of the research and I would like to thank Chloé Sugier, Simon Louwet, Erika Kaufmann and Atika Moha for their assistance and hospitality during my visit to Aix.

In the year 1960, when African states gained their independence from European colonial powers almost ‘every minute,’ one group that had debate and skepticism over the benefits of decolonization were the Tuareg. Basil Davidson speaks in many of his books of the optimism and hope in the future that Africans had during the period of decolonization, but it would be difficult to rank the Tuareg in with this celebration. Tuareg chiefs were not happy to see the French leave, though one would assume they would have considering the history their fathers and grandfathers shared with the French. It was violent half the time and other half involved an attempt by the French to undermine Tuareg society (more about this in a moment). The reason for their disdain during the independence movement lay in the dominance of a foreign ethnic group in the African political parties about to receive the reigns of the colonial administration. The Bambara were both the colonial officials and the majority of the independence movement in Bamako, the Zarma in Niamey and though Algeria was further complicated with a war, the Arabs in Algiers. What directions these groups were going to take the former French colonies was difficult to predict and the Tuareg, though the proprietors of the large part of the Saharan desert, were about to fall into the hands of yet another alien central authority.

The Tuareg themselves are not a centralized ethnic group though there are similarities in language and custom between regions. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, when the French, Italians and English moved into the interior of Africa they found six major Tuareg political territories: Touareg Ajjer, Touareg du Hoggar, Touareg de l’Aïr, Touareg de l’Adrar des Ifoghas, Touareg du Niger, and Touareg Kel Gress (see map). Within these regions existed many confederations of Tuareg groups, sometimes living symbiotically next to each other and other times raiding and pillaging each others’ camps. In addition, these territories were not solely occupied by the Tuareg as there were and are distinct groups of Arabs (Kounta, Mahamid and Bérabich to name a few), Tubu and Fulani living in the same region. The Tuareg, however, were the local power elites in terms of their military strength and their roles in the Saharan trade. The French recognized this and as they encroached on Tuareg lands they played on the rivalries other groups had with the Tuareg as well as divisions that existed in Tuareg society.

An example of this divide and rule came with the French expansion along the Niger River and their relations with the Oulliminden Tuareg, a group that claimed jurisdiction on the east side [left bank] of the river from Bourem, Mali to Tillabéry, Niger and further east to the Tamesna Region though their territory would be reduced to the lands around Ménaka with the installation of the French. In the 1890s as French soldiers and officers moved further up the river, they found the Oulliminden in a bitter rivalry with the Kounta [an Arab group] that also claimed the territory around Bourem. The Kounta and the Oulliminden were not at a full scale war but instead conducted raids on each others’ camps from time to time, with those victimized seeking retribution through counter raids. Further complicating the picture were settled groups of Songhaï and Bella Bella [slaves of the Tuareg] who were most vulnerable to these raids and banditry from raiding Kounta and Oulliminden.

The French, though their initial presence was weak, had the military and resources to bring stability to the region and they did this by first befriending the settled peoples along the river and later the Kounta. The Kounta debated little over allying with the French as they saw their presence as an opportunity to secure the territory around Bourem from the Oulliminden. Their alliance to the foreigners would pay off in the long run as the French committed to the region and suppressed any resistance while rewarding groups that aided them in securing their control over the region.

The first collective effort by the Oulliminden to push out the French came in 1899 when the Europeans placed soldiers and built posts in Gao, Ansongo, Sinder and Dounzou. The Tuareg not only attacked these remote colonial posts but also raided Kounta camps near Bourem which were violent but lucrative attacks for the Oulliminden. The region had been experiencing famine for several years not due to drought because the raids destabilized trade and food production. A year later, the Oulliminden ceased their military campaigns in the hope that the French would stop their expansion and guarantee their rights to lands around Bourem. The French did not concede their posts along the river but did (temporarily) create a protectorate for the Oulliminden as they shifted their military operations to the Hoggar and Aïr Mountains to suppress other Tuareg resistance.

The protectorate meant nothing to the Kounta. Angered at the sacking of several of their camps during the Oulliminden uprising, they retaliated in 1901 by raiding a large camp of Oulliminden at Tiguirirt, killing men, capturing slaves and women and taking animals, equipment and weapons. The Oulliminden would strike back but the French did little to bring peace between the two for the next ten years. Only in 1912 did the French impose sanctions on the Oulliminden for conducting raiding parties.

As it became apparent that the protectorate existed only on paper, the Oulliminden approached the French once more in an effort to secure what few rights possibly remained. The Oulliminden were weakened by the earlier clash with the French and by the current Kounta raids. Yet the French were also in no position to implement their policies in Oulliminden territory just yet. For a brief period from 1906-08, the French were considering making the Oulliminden territory, at this point reduced to the region of Ménaka, a Secteur Nomade where colonial policies would favor the preservation of nomad customs and livelihoods. This idea, however, was never realized at least not intentionally.

Many of the colonial policies implemented in Francophone Africa fractured Tuareg society further (at least for the next ten years). The French emancipated the slaves and vassals of the Tuareg on moral, diplomatic and economic grounds. Many of the settled peoples along the Niger River that the French allied with during colonial expansion were slaves of the Tuareg or paying tithes to the Tuareg to ensure their security. Tithes to Tuareg nobles became taxes to French administrators as these communities were potential revenue makers and a source of food production for the colony. Raiding and banditry did not end under French rule but the scale and frequency was reduced dramatically to the point that this was not a viable strategy for many Tuareg.

The Oulliminden did not passively relinquish their military authority in the region but were delayed in any resistance to French dominion for several years. First, their involvement with raids against the Kounta occupied the Oulliminden and delayed any organized resistance to foreign domination. Second the French, influenced by Kounta leaders, imposed economic sanctions on Oulliminden territory in order to punish the group seen as responsible for the region’s instability. Finally few rains came to the region on the summer months of 1912. The Oulliminden faced vulnerability to famine in 1913 with the violence of Kounta raiding parties, the suppression of regional trade by the French, and the failure of rains to renew pasture reserves for their animals.

Despite the drawbacks the Oulliminden armed for a future revolt to French rule in 1914. Misguided by inaccurate intelligence of the French weakening due to other insurgencies up river, the Oulliminden commenced small-scale attacks on French forts in May. The French were swift in their response, arresting the leaders of the revolt before a large assault ensued but in 1916 the incarcerated leaders escaped their captors and organized their forces for a large scale assault to the northeast of Andéramboukane, a military post situated on a permanent lake. The lake was and still is an important water source for the Tuareg and other pastoralists in the region. Rebel leaders must have viewed the control of this water source as vital to regain their authority in the territory and in the maintenance of their herds during the revolt.

The French, guided by accurate intelligence, sent an expeditionary force backed up by Kounta méharistes around the lake to outflank the Oulliminden and in doing so, surprised the Tuareg camps. The battle was completely one-sided as the French ended the Oulliminden revolt and the Kounta received for their assistance carte blanche in dividing up the spoils of the disbanded Oulliminden camps. Once again the Kounta profited from their allegiance and partnership with the French while the Oulliminden experienced hardship and loss to their resistance to colonial rule.

With other Tuareg revolts ending in defeat and submission to French rule in Algeria, Niger and Upper Volta [today known as Burkina Faso], the French pursued a general policy of converting the Tuareg from pastoral livelihoods to farming. Colonial officials viewed the Tuareg nomadic way of life as backward and an obstacle to the development of their colonies. Furthermore, tax collection and policing of African communities was more difficult to conduct with mobile populations as was learned through the intrigues and revolts that took place from 1914-17. In the case of Oulliminden territory, plans and programs to develop irrigation and privatize land in the Ménaka region were proposed but little was implemented as the limited revenues collected in the French colonies often went to grand projects in the south like the Malian cotton growing schemes around Koutiala and Bougouni or the major rice growing project known as l’Office du Niger near Mopti. This neglect allowed many Tuareg the opportunity to restock their herds and continue their livelihoods with minimal interference from colonial officials.

The little funding that trickled into the Ménaka region often went to policing and the maintenance of roads. At the height of the Great Depression, French colonial officials began a debate over whether to keep the region in the administration of Soudan Français where Bamako was the capital (1400 km from Ménaka) or to integrate it into the colony of Niger. Proponents of the change argued that Niamey (the capital of the Niger colony by 1926 and 250 km from Ménaka) was closer to Oulliminden territory and had greater economic ties to Western Niger, more so than the rest of Mali. Another argument voiced later by officials on the ground was the difficulty in regulating the black market activities that developed in Ménaka and extended into the Anglophone colonies of Nigeria and the Gold Coast [the country known as Ghana today].

Any possibility of connecting the region of Ménaka to Niger ended with the start of World War II and the Malian nationalist movement that appeared shortly after the war. Colonial officials shifted their priorities to the maintenance of African loyalty to the French Republic and to the recruitment of colonial subjects into Charles De Gaulle’s resistance to German occupation after 1940. The same ethnic group that filled the ranks of Soudan’s colonial administration was also recruited into De Gaulle’s infantry. The Bambara dominated the ranks of Africans working in the Soudan Français, they were the majority of troops coming from the Soudan to fight against the Germans, and they would dominate the leadership and membership of the political party calling for an end to French rule in the late 1940s and 1950s. The independence movement in Soudan would not accept any reorganization of territory that did not favor their inheritance and when independence came, the new political elite had ideas of how to integrate Mali’s diverse population into one nationality and grand schemes to develop the remoter regions and its resources.

For most Oulliminden the changing political picture had little to no consequence on their lives. French rule, though initially brutal, had little influence on their lives from 1917 to the 1950s. They were able to maintain their society, restock their herds from the violence of the 1910s and redevelop their market links to the south due to the underfunding, understaffing and lack of interest officials in Bamako had in the remote and drier parts of Soudan Français. The only exception to this was the development of nomadic schools in the 1950s where Tuareg parents began gradually to send one or all of their children. As long as the government did not interfere with their society and access to local resources, the Oulliminden were indifferent to either a European or African administration. For a few individuals in Oulliminden society, the new political elite was an opportunity for advancement and their participation in the independence movement in many situations rewarded them local seats of power in the Ménaka region or modest administrative posts in Bamako. Many in Oulliminden leadership however, held concerns over what future plans the Bambara-dominated government held for the Ménaka region and they would be the forefathers and foundation of Tuareg resistance to the central authority of the Malian state in decades to come.

Amnesty International members and others interested in Human Rights

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Sat, 20 Dec 2008 11:38:00 +0000

I have a large posting coming up next week on the origins of Tuareg mistrust in central authority but for now I wanted to post a link to a large New York Times article on the current rebellion in Niger that a friend of mine brought to my attention. In my opinion, the writer romanticizes the position of the rebels, le Mouvement dès Nigériens Pour la Justice or MNJ but I do agree with the author that more people need to be aware of what is going on in the Sahara regarding indigenous peoples’ right to their land and resources. Please, if you are interested in this subject read on and contact your congressional leaders, Amnesty International or other human rights organizations about what actions can be taken to end the violence in Niger.

The link to the NY Times article is:

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/world/africa/15niger.html?_r=1&hp

I thank Justin Marcello for bringing this article to my attention.

The Nigérien Touareg Rebellion

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Wed, 02 Apr 2008 18:12:00 +0000

On December 24th, 2007, I ate dinner with a person who is perhaps the second most important person in the Nigérien military. He had traveled extensively in his life and even trained at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in the United States (very few Nigériens have such experiences). I asked him how well he knew his own country. He named some very remote outposts in Niger, including Tillia, Assamakka, Djado, Chrifa and Ngourti (all in the extreme north and east of the country). It was clear to me there was not a corner of his country that he had not visited, conducted exercises in or patrolled. I was in company with a very well seasoned veteran of Niger.

Later in the meal the table was lacking drinking water and as another went to retrieve a pitcher, I made the comment in the Tamasheq language, “Aman Eeman” which translated means “Water is the source of life.” The well seasoned veteran of Niger turned to me and asked me in earnest, “Is that the Arabic language?” I would expect such a response of people living in villages of southern Niger but coming from someone who has worked and lived many years in northern Niger where Arabs and Tamasheq groups live, this came as a shock to me. Certainly in his experiences he must have heard if not learned a few phrases of Arabic and Tamasheq, at least enough to make a distinction between the two.

I spent three months in Niger (October through December 2007) doing my best to receive approval to conduct and implement research regarding food security issues among pastoralists in the north. If I had succeeded I would have been interviewing many Tamasheqs and Arabs as they are the majority who herd animals in this remote region. I had concerns returning to Niger to conduct this research not because of previous experiences as I had an excellent site visit the year before, but because of the rebellion that started in February 2007 in the north. A group known as the MNJ: Mouvement dès Nigériens pour la Justice began to attack military installations, government buildings and the uranium mines around Arlit and Akokan.

When I returned to Niger in October 2007 I held no opinions about the political problems in the north. Receiving approval from the ministry of education to conduct my research was my main priority. I did not return to ask questions about the rebellion. For me, the rebellion was a distraction and an annoyance but I did ask people in Niamey if I should change the research site considering my initial plan called for returning to Arlit. Everyone, including the ministry of education encouraged me to work in the north. I pursued it.

I was back in Arlit in early December. I was delayed because of additional conditions the ministry of education continued to add to my request each time I returned to their bureau. When I finally fulfilled all of their conditions, I believed that this was the end of the difficulties and that I will have no problem starting my interviews. I made sure to conduct formalities with local officials, starting with the governor of the Agadez region. He initially told me my research was fine but to remain in the city limits of Arlit, Akokan, Agadez and Tchighozérine. There was no confusion over this as I knew the ministry of education gave me the same parameters.
I then returned to Arlit to settle in and look for a temporary residence, an interpreter and reunite with my collaborator and friends. Here too, I immediately conducted formalities with the commissariat and the mayor. The police commissioner told me the same as the governor: to remain in the towns and not to circulate in the countryside but that my presence was welcome and wanted. The mayor, however, ended any hopes of conducting my research. At first he tried to scare me off telling me my security was at risk in Arlit. Though I assured him I was as safe in Arlit as I was in Niamey or any other part of Niger (actually safer since I had friends and colleagues here) it did not matter. He eventually decided to be frank with me telling me he did not care for me or my research. He told me he would use all of his power to terminate my research immediately.

The next few days were full of drama. The police visited my collaborator at his office several times trying to find out more information about me, my research and contacts in town. When I had a private moment with him, he said it best, “They are afraid. They are afraid you will sit down with people from the countryside and find out how bad the government is handling this uprising.” Both my collaborator and I knew that my days were limited.

The authorities in Arlit had reason. People I bumped into on the streets were very willing to tell me of the atrocities that their government is committing in the countryside. From what people told me, there are frequent extrajudicial killings, there is excessive force and human rights’ violations including the killing of animals, destruction of property, poisoning of wells and the military planting landmines all over Niger. When I asked about how the MNJ were conducting their operations, people had nothing bad to say. They explained to me the make up of the MNJ: they are ex-soldiers, ex-gendarmes and ex-police who left their service in February 2007 and returned to their villages in the north to alert people of the upcoming crisis. People voluntarily left their villages for the towns. All over the region of Agadez, there are villages that have been completely abandoned. Only a few villages such as Timia have not moved. People went either to the large towns like Arlit, Akokan, Agadez and Tchighozérine or went south to other regions out of the conflict (Later, when I traveled near Tanout I saw a line of tents right at the administrative boundary of Zinder-Agadez. It was quite a surprise to see pastoralists making this imaginary line a physical reality).

The MNJ does not represent all people of all different walks in Niger. If there are any Haoussa, Zarma or Kanouri individuals in this group, it is probably for their own ideological reasons. Their numbers are principally Tuaregs and Arabs. We in the West assume that these groups are fairer-skinned than other Africans and this has to do with the heritage of the Sahara: groups from Yemen migrating into the region after the 7th century. This is true but there are also dark-skinned Tuaregs and Arabs in the MNJ, having African ancestry but integrated into Tuareg-Arab society centuries ago when they were the slaves, blacksmiths and warriors of Saharan groups. So no, the rebels do not represent all ethnicities in Niger but they do represent the people of Northern Niger who have been neglected and ignored by their own government for over 40 years.

The government though neglecting northern people has not neglected northern natural resources. In the late 1960s, uranium was discovered around Arlit and Akokan and this contributed to the development of the towns of Arlit and Akokan. Over the 40 year period a hospital, schools, housing, electricity, running water and a paved road running all the way to Arlit (1200 km from Niamey) were built. These services were built with revenues from the mine but are used primarily for the workers of the mines, who are principally Haoussa and Zarma. Arabs and Tuaregs make up less than 20% of the manual workers, there are only 3 total Tamasheq engineers at the sites in Arlit and Akokan and none of the administration is Arab or Tamasheq. Perhaps one could argue that such statistics are fair since Arabs and Tamasheq groups are less than 10% of the population in Niger but such an argument falls flat when looking at the statistics of workers at the gold mine operations of Samira Hill and Libiri pits (near Niamey). 100% of the administration, engineers and manual workers are Zarma. There is no room for other groups. The Tamasheq and Arabs in the north are aware of this and resent the domination of Haoussa and Zarma groups in the mining operations on their lands. This is what the rebellion is about: IT IS A LAND RIGHTS ISSUE AND NOTHING ELSE. The MNJ, at least initially, has not demanded separation and independence from Niamey. What they are asking for is a better representation of Tamasheq and Arabs in civil service, working in the uranium mine and a fair cut of revenues invested in the development of the north. In the Agadez region outside of Arlit and Agadez, there are few schools, few cement wells and infrastructure.

Large numbers of Nigériens do not live in the north; they live in the south. But while the Nigérien government has profited from uranium revenues from the north, they have been able to rely on foreign organizations to contribute to if not provide development to populations in the south ever since the drought of 1973. Development in Niger is a political game with winners and losers. My first impression of Niamey when I first arrived was it is the capital of the NGO (non-governmental organization) world. Think of an NGO like Save the Children, Oxfam, Doctors without Frontiers, Action Contre la Faim (Action against Hunger), CARRITAS (a Catholic Relief Organization) and others and one will likely find an office in Niamey. Bi-lateral organizations are also numerous and operating here. The United States’ USAID, SNV (the Netherlands), DANIDA (Denmark), and even one from Monaco (Monegasque Official Development Assistance) are working on poverty alleviation in Niger. There are conditions with these humanitarian efforts, however. Their operations are often restricted to southern Niger and little assistance is implemented in the north. When I talked to volunteers of JICA (a Japanese volunteer organization that is similar to Peace Corps from the United States), I was told they are only allowed to work as far north as Tahoua and as far east as Zinder. It is obvious when one visits villages in the south and sees covered markets, new schools, cement wells and paved roads. Depending on whom one talks to, the reasons given for this uneven geographical development can be “for security reasons” (and certainly some NGOs have reservations in operating in the north for the safety of their staff) or because the invitation has not been given to them by Niamey. The Nigérien government holds the reigns to assistance in the north. No aid can be implemented there without the approval of Niamey. But they give little slack to NGOs and bilateral organizations. This is why northern Niger is poorer than southern Niger. The Nigérien government not only extracts northern resources without reciprocating, they also lock out foreign assistance.

In a matter of five days after talking to the mayor of Arlit, I was ordered by the police commissioner to return to Agadez and meet with the governor once more. They would not tell me what it was in reference to but I could sense that I was being pushed both out of my research and out of Niger. I visited my friends and collaborator one last time and explained the situation. They too sensed the injustice of the mayor and their government. I did not come to Niger to interview MNJ members and cover the rebellion, but at this point it did not matter. Even if I had started to interview people, the rebellion was likely to corrupt any data I collected.
Agadez is where I began to shift my allegiance from being independent from the rebellion to sympathies towards the MNJ’s cause. It started with the about-face the governor took with me. I was told that my research was suspended until I visit the ministry of interior and the ministry of defense and receive approval from both ministries. This decision on their part was right at the eve of Tabaski, perhaps the largest Muslim holiday and in Niger, a very big affair. It is the celebration of when Abraham was prepared to kill his first born to show his faith in God, though God intervened and instead a ram was sacrificed. People actually take out loans to buy the needed sheep to slaughter during this celebration. I asked for permission to stay in the area for a week as I knew there would be no one at any ministry during the holiday. I was denied and ordered to return to Niamey. They made no arrangements for me to return to Niamey, however and instead I decided to shift my mission from researcher to tourist for the next three weeks. Christmas was a week after Tabaski and after that the New Year. I needed a break from the frustrations and I wanted to opportunity to see other parts of Niger.

I visited Tanout but by the start of Tabaski I was in Zinder. From there I moved on to Diffa with the intentions of going further north to Nguigmi but this is where problems and interrogations started. I was carrying all my belongings with me, including maps in a map case, my computer, GPS and audio-recorder. The gendarmes in Diffa controlling the route to Nguigmi stopped me but when they saw my approval from Niamey, they let me continue my travels to Nguigmi. I arrived there at night but in the morning, I made sure to pass the commissariat and register with the police (it is a fairly remote place, near the Chadian border). I had befriended someone in town and actually started asking questions about the Kanouri and Toubou languages (I have an avid curiosity and thirst to learn African languages ... something that also was problematic in future run-ins with Nigérien authorities) but the gendarmes had come for me, not giving me enough time to collect all my belongings and this time transporting me back to Diffa under armed guard.

I covered up nothing. I explained to the commandant in Diffa that I was a researcher, but that I had some time before I needed to go back to Niamey to meet with officials and that I was merely acting as a tourist. He didn’t believe me and he told me he was going to expose my true mission. I had nothing to hide. He looked at all my maps and asked for the receipts for them (I managed to find them all). He looked at my computer and audio-recorder (only pulling them out of the case and opening them, not turning on the power. I would not have let it go that far; I would have asked him to contact my embassy if he made such a request). I spent two days answering his questions. He was uneasy with the amount of Zarma, Haoussa and Tamasheq I had learned over three months. After his attempt to learn more about my mission, he was ready to send me back to Zinder to meet with the commandant there but I insisted that my belongings left in Nguigmi be returned to me. He had no choice but to order one of his men in Nguigmi to return to Diffa with the things I was missing. I delayed my return to Zinder by one day.

Once again, I was brought from Diffa to Zinder by armed guard. I arrived in the town in the early morning and only had a few hours to sleep before meeting with the commandant. I wasn’t in the best of moods when meeting with this man. The meeting was brief, he basically ordered me to return to Niamey immediately. I asked him if he makes such requests to tourists frequently. He replied that he does not meet with tourists (the threat of my presence in Niger was never more apparent then at this moment). I wasn’t going to comply easily. I quickly remembered that it is Christmas Eve and I told him that I do not travel on Catholic holidays. He had no choice as to deny me the opportunity to enjoy an important religious holiday and attend church the next day could have been scandalous for his government. I stayed in Zinder for Christmas Eve and Christmas, staying at the gendarmerie and under 24 hour surveillance.
The commandant who I had Christmas Eve dinner with and was ignorant of the difference between the Arab and Tamasheq languages was this man. He was generous to me, providing me with an escort who drove me from place to place around town, offering me the best quarters at the gendarmerie and my meals but I would have preferred my freedom and being responsible for my needs. I already knew the town pretty well from my first visit a week earlier. I checked my e-mail earlier in the day. My advisor had told me to terminate my mission in Niger. This was both relieving and disappointing to me: relieving because the harassment and constant detainments from the authorities was frustrating and fruitless; disappointing because I grew aware of the injustices that take place in Niger both currently and in the past. I enjoyed my Christmas without incident, but my mind was certainly focused on my friends and colleague up in Arlit who I was going to have to contact and inform that my time was ending soon in Niger.

The day after Christmas, I returned to Niamey. There, I was free to circulate and move about without surveillance. I immediately went to the embassy of Mali and requested a one-month visa. If Niger was going to be a loss then I was going to take some time and revisit people who aided my research in Mali. I was more sensitive to the media and peoples’ opinions of the rebellion at this point. People in the south are kept ignorant by their government. Constantly, the news programs broadcasted from Niamey attached the word ‘terrorist’ to the MNJ and accuse them of planting land mines and attacking civilian vehicles in the north. I had passed back and forth between Abalak, Agadez, Arlit and Tanout several times without incident. Yes, I was lucky. But the media fails to tell Nigérien citizens of the tactics the military is taking to stamp out the MNJ and protect the uranium lorry. Most of the soldiers and arms are committed to protecting the uranium, not civilians traveling to or from the north.

People who remembered seeing me on the streets in October and November stopped me and asked me why I had returned. I explained to them the problems I encountered. Haoussa and Zarma groups would constantly blame the rebels for my misfortune. I made sure to reply back that perhaps the government has some guilt in my aborted mission since they have neglected the north for so long but profited from the uranium reserves. Some Haoussa and Zarma did not even know where Arlit or Agadez was. They thought I was coming from Algeria or Libya. It is ignorance like this that has helped Mohammedou Tandia (the president of Niger) and his administration keep their power in this crisis. A month before the rebellion, there was a “No Confidence” vote passed down from the Nigérien Congress but this criticism was shelved when problems escalated in the north. People forgot their grievances and have blindly followed Tandia’s no tolerance policy with the MNJ.

Groups of Tamasheq that I crossed paths with were curious about my quick return, too. When I explained to them my misfortune and interrogations they smiled and shook their heads. They replied to me, “Now you know. Now you know what we encounter each and every day ... injustice.” When I told them about the commandant’s ignorance of the difference between the Arab and Tamasheq language they responded without hesitation, “Yet we are forced to learn Zarma and Haoussa when we work and live here in Niamey. Tell me in your opinion, who makes the effort to be Nigérien in this country: a person from the north that has to learn Zarma and Haoussa to work and make a few CFA or a person in the south who know only their mother tongue and sit behind a big desk in a tall ministry?” They had reason. Niger is currently not a state where people have a sense of nationality and unity. It is a territory where ethnic groups are looking out for their own selfish interests. I hate using this word but it is appropriate here: Niger is experiencing the phenomenon of tribalism.

Whether the Nigérien government has profited from outside assistance by calling the MNJ a terrorist organization is something I am unaware of. However, Mohammedou Tandia has nothing to lose in calling the MNJ a group of terrorists and accusing them of drug trafficking. It has kept southern Nigériens ignorant of the uneven development in their country and the land rights’ issue the MNJ bases their actions. Such a claim appeals to Western powers to assist against these so-called “terrorists.” I read recently an article that hypothesizes the possible connections of Al Qaeda to the Tuareg rebel movements both in Niger and Mali. As a researcher that has traveled and lived for the past year-and-a-half in these regions I found the article preposterous. The Tuareg have little in common with Arabia and Central Asian groups and little interest in what is happening in Middle East. They do have a connection to Libya because of Tuareg groups that work and live there and I don’t deny a connection to Mummar Qadaffi but many of the Tuaregs I talked to were critical of the Libyan president seeing him as a profiteer like many of the local politicians of their own countries.I wish not to post this article without some criticism of the MNJ. No political movement is saintly and free of committing atrocities 100% of the time. It is likely that they are funding their military actions against the Nigérien government through drug trafficking, human trafficking (the rebellion is taking place in the routes that clandestine Africans take) or other dubious activities. Certainly their relations with Ibrahima Bahanga in Tin-Zaouaten (northern Mali) complicates matters as there is stronger evidence that Bahanga’s group does engage in drug trafficking and currently holds two Austrians kidnapped at the Tunisian-Algerian border two weeks ago. But the MNJ’s conduct during the first year of this conflict must be commended. They did not target civilians, at least people not connected to the uranium operations. Only Nigérien authorities and services related to the uranium mining operations were attacked. They warned civilians in the countryside of the upcoming violence. I conducted many interviews with victims of the 1990s rebellion in Mali who complained to me of rebels stealing their animals, destroying their property and killing family members but no such complaints were passed on to me when I was in Niger. I have fears that in the future the MNJ will be forced to shift their tactics to attacking citizens, banditry, kidnapping foreign nationals that come across their paths and other malicious acts. But considering that the Nigérien government is already killing people in the northern countryside, poisoning wells, killing animals, destroying property, spreading propaganda and pushing out any form of independent coverage of the rebellion in order to stamp out the MNJ, what choice do they have? Little ...

Formalities with Local Officials

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Thu, 20 Dec 2007 08:43:00 +0000

I have experience thanks to my Peace Corps days of conducting formalities with local officials. A good majority of the time officials are very preoccupied with other issues and introducing oneself and presenting one’s mission often goes smoother than expected. Still, doing this in a foreign language is not easy and there are surprises from time to time. The probability of having a bad first impression makes this process one of the most nerve-racking. Waiting in the lounge of a local official is a good chance to practice introductory remarks but at the same time it is also a moment of anxiety as often it is difficult to know which type of personality one is about to come face-to-face with.

Having approval from the agency that is responsible for your being in country is the first priority. To just show up without something from the capitol explaining your mission is not looked upon favorably and they will see your visit as a waste of their time. After that, dressing sharp and showing up early in the morning on Monday-Thursday (but not Friday!) is the best bet at having a successful introduction. If they speak your language and they make an effort to converse with you in it then do talk to them in your maternal tongue. And if they try to test your abilities in local languages be humble about it (even if you are proficient) but answer their questions in the local language as best as you can.

Do not be surprised if the official lives in the capitol or another country, like France, England or the United States. They may be living outside of their region to best represent and work for their community. The reverse is also possible unfortunately, where they may be living outside of their community because they have profited from their position and do little or nothing for their constituents. This of course varies from individual to individual. If the official is not there, it is not necessary to track the person down as often there is someone at the office to represent them and receive your introduction. They have the power to approve your mission and papers.

Despite these preventions things could still go disastrous. My very last effort at conducting formalities was the worst one ever and there was little I could do to prevent the outcome. The official simply did not like the idea of a researcher interviewing people in his region because there is a rebellion in the department of Arlit, Niger at present. The government of Niger has done its best to keep out foreign journalists and anyone who could possibly bring the events of the rebellion and the cause of the rebels to a larger audience. The official started my meeting by cajoling me. He argued that I should not to live and work in his region because of ‘security issues’ but I was able to argue through this facade by explaining the roots I had already made in Arlit. I had already had three visits, found a collaborator to work with, a potential landlord and interpreter, and made several friends in the marketplace. In truth, I was probably safer in his region then where I am right now (southern Niger).

Further into the formalities he admitted he did not like my research and living in his community and that he would do his best to terminate my mission. He did so as the very next day, I was ordered by the commissariat to return to the Governor in Agadez. I had already conducted formalities with the Governor three days earlier with no problems but upon my second return, the authority did an about-face and told me my research was suspended until I seek the approval of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense, both in Niamey. There is no chance of meeting with either of these until after the New Year as it is Tabaski right now and soon it will be the New Year. I will try once more but I have my doubts as to whether I will receive approval to conduct my research in the immediate future.

My collaborator, who had several visits from the police the day I met with the local official, said it best, “They are afraid of what people are going to tell you about the rebellion.” I have tried to remain independent and silent on the rebellion as it is not my mission to report on the troubles up north. People, however, have shared with me their opinions and observations regarding the clashes that have taken place between the military and rebels in Iferouâne, Arlit and other areas of the north. As tempted as I am to share this information (especially after my last meeting with the last local official in Arlit), I will refrain until after I confirm with the Ministry of Interior and Defense that I cannot conduct research in the north and I am out of Niger’s jurisdiction.

Authorization to Conduct Research

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Mon, 17 Dec 2007 08:28:00 +0000

Like fingerprints, no country is the same when it comes to the regulations in conducting research in their territory. One could write as many different versions of an introduction letter, explaining their mission and print it out on department letterhead; hound their superiors for a recommendation letter and have the support and financing of a scientific organization. It does not matter. There is going to be something missing and needed before one receives that magic paper that one pulls out for authorities who are confused over why one is going house to house and asking questions to people as to how their lives have changed.

I can only share my experiences in Mali and Niger here. In Mali, going armed with a recommendation letter from one’s advisor, curriculum vitae, and a dossier explaining the goal of the research, the subject, the prospective site, the time period and possible contacts is a start. If things go well, an official pulls out a form for one to fill out. If they are not busy, they will type it out verifying the information, request 2 photos and 5,000 F CFA for the current year (even if your research overlaps into the next year, one will need to return to Bamako for reauthorization at the end of the year). I managed to complete the process in three days the first time and the reauthorization only took me a day (I was recognized when I arrived at the bureau which helps). When one completes their research a report is expected, explaining their findings and possible future research prospects in Mali.

Niger is quite different. It is necessary to have the recommendation letter, curriculum vitae and dossier I mentioned above (with each category separated for each aspect of the research). Furthermore, a photocopy of one’s current student ID, a photocopy of the first page of one’s passport, and one’s international drivers’ license is also mandatory (if one has a vehicle for their research). In addition, one must collaborate with an academic or specialist on the subject of the prospective research in country. In most if not all cases such an individual is found at the only university in Niger: Abdou Moumouni University in Niamey. This can take time as coordinating and meeting with people eats up time.

There is no charge for the authorization request and no photos are needed. When I first started the process I was told that the process takes a week maximum. I was not done until six weeks later. The reasons for this delay were many. But in the last three weeks of the delay I realized that there is one person at the ministry who approves or rejects research proposals. Niger is in the process of decentralizing its government but at the same time some departments remain very top heavy, where responsibility is in the hands of a few or only one official. If the ministry approves one’s research a two-page authorization with conditions is printed out. My situation called for a restriction on circulation as there is a rebellion in the north (more information about that in future postings) but there are two conditions that are universal and everyone should be aware of. The Republic of Niger expects a report at the end of the research (like Mali) but in addition they request that five copies of any published material be sent to the ministry within the first month of publication.

Once one has the approval of the Ministry of Education in the capitol of the country where one conducts their research, the next step is meeting and conducting formalities with the local officials at the prospective research site(s). Governors, mayors, prefects, commandants, commissariats, village and traditional chiefs are often the officials one meets with to explain one’s mission. The experiences and conduct with these vary and merit a different posting.

The Tuareg in Large Urban Centers

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Thu, 29 Nov 2007 07:46:00 +0000

This is not a new subject. Edmond Bernus, in addition to contributing to human geographical studies of the pastoral Tuareg of central Niger also looked at the phenomenon of Tuareg men migrating to large urban centers. These men sought work and/or opportunities in major cities like Abidjan, Lagos and Paris. Though I am not well versed on what findings Edmond Bernus and others have of Tuareg migration to cities, I have some observations of changes both intentional and unintentional of Tuareg customs due to these sometimes seasonal, sometimes permanent migrations.

The most obvious and perhaps dramatic change is polygamy. Many anthropological studies of the past and in recent times examine how Taureg men who marry more than one wife with or without consent are both ridiculed and disciplined by their first wife, often resulting in the man losing his place in the household. Men who have more than one wife is an extremely rare situation in their rural society as Tuareg women have the trait of jealousy and exercise what social powers they have to discourage polygamy.

In the large urban areas, it is not uncommon these days to find Tuareg men who have 2, 3 or 4 wives (depending on their means as well as personal choice). This is no doubt an influence that comes from the communities of Songhaï, Haoussa, and coastal societies that the Tuareg work and reside in. From informal discussions that I have had with polygamous Tuareg men, their wives often come from the cities they live in and not the countryside. In the countryside, the practice of marrying one wife is still practiced and socially encouraged.

Among the men who migrate to the large urban centers in sub-Saharan Africa, the most obvious groups are the artisans. They too have undergone changes as the necklaces they sell are no longer used for promises of marriage in Tuareg society but for tourists who find the designs unusual and representative of the nomadic Saharan community. Their art has even diversified as silversmiths no longer dominate the ranks. It is easy to find men selling leather products (sometimes made by Tuareg women from the countryside but also produced and sold by the urban merchants) as well as miniatures carved out of mica or soapstone. A few of these artisans have also tapped into the market of making simple toys from tin cans, scraps of metal and wire like the children did in the past and still do. Once a means for African children to have toys that resemble the race cars, dump trucks and fire engines that European, North American and Japanese children played with, these metal creations are now sold to foreigners and sometimes Africans who have interest in supporting local craftsmen.

Clothing has changed dramatically, not only in the urban centers but also in the countryside. Tuareg who rely on tourists with their occupations often will wear the traditional white, blue or black turbans and robes, but the vivid greens, purples, oranges, reds, pinks, and blues of Sub-Saharan communities have definitely penetrated into the countryside. It is not uncommon to find the wax-patterned cloths with images of exotic birds and animals sown into the design of a Tuareg kaftan or boubou as well. Furthermore, the men who occupy manual labor positions like masonry, water delivery to homes, or motorcycle repair often wear occidental clothing (blue jeans and t-shirts) but often still wear their turbans around town.

Their change in diet is interesting as there are trade-offs from coming from the countryside and living in the big city. In the countryside, they were eating some of the best dairy products in the world. There are also foods that are gathered and used both in good seasons and times of food scarcity that at their worst act as ‘filler’ foods, but some are very nutritious and add variety to their diets. But they cannot subsist on these foods from nature and the products of their animals alone. Markets are limited in remote areas. Vegetables and fruits are uncommon and not available throughout the year and transporting grains to the countryside is costly and difficult in terms of preserving. In the city, they have greater access to fruits, vegetables and grains but those who have the means have also fallen into the trap of convenience buying instant drinks, powdered milk and processed foods which are not as rich or nutritious as raw or fresh foods. Another complexity of living in the city is the cost of foods. While villages around Abidjan, Cotonou and Lomé may charge a pittance for agricultural products, prices in the urban centers are often high due to transportation and storage costs.
One thing that has not changed because of urban living or influence from the interaction of different cultures is the pride that Tuaregs take in their culture. Their resistance to foreign domination in the past and their resilience in maintaining a distinct Tuareg identity, separate from their neighbors and appealing to foreign tourists is evident in their manners and conversations. The urban Tuareg may not wear the indigo turban, have married their childhood sweetheart from the contryside or even possess one camel to their name. In all likelihood, they are probably married to two women (living in different cities), wear Hawaiian t-shirts, drink instant coffee in the morning and speak French better than Kel Tamasheq. But in their minds, they do have an image of themselves mounted on a camel, wearing the robe and turban of noble rank, and their wife and children with the family tent and possessions riding not far behind. The legend of what a Tuareg is and represents is rooted firmly in place.

Clandestine, Controls and Crossing the Sahara

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Thu, 18 Oct 2007 10:40:00 +0000

Can a White person be a clandestine? Is it possible? With so many Africans risking a small fortune, not including also their own personal safety to cross the Sahara and make their way to Europe, I imagine it is ironic that I did the reverse and traveled from Tunis to Niamey. Why? It is a matter of funds. And perhaps it is also to better understand the experience of crossing the paths that Black Africans move through illegally.

The route I ended up traveling was a bit illogical, but perhaps that is common experience. I initially planned on traveling first through the Tunisian cities of Gafsa, Tozeur and Nefta to cross into Algeria, but the authorities at the border refused to let me through without a guide. Since I was using forms of community transit, I had no choice but return to a border post further north, one called Bou Chebka and cross into Tébessa, Algeria. There, the authorities were surprised to see an American with an Algerian visa and on foot but after the stun of my presence, they allowed me to pass. From Tébessa, I moved on to Constantine where I was able to find frequent traffic for the south, first Ouargla, then El Goléa, In Salah and Tamanrasset. Travel from Constantine to Tamanrasset took approximately 33 hours directly. In Tamanrasset, I waited roughly 30 hours for my driver to find a sufficient number of clients; many who are illegal aliens who have run into difficulties with the Algerian authorities and are looking to cross through Libya.

So what is it like? There is the initial challenge of finding someone to trust to take you where you need to go. That in itself is difficult as people are abandoned frequently by their chauffeurs, particularly in the Sahara desert. After that, it is a matter of negotiating the fare for passage. As one can imagine, if one offers too little the chauffeur will refuse and if one offers too much, there is the concern that they will not have enough to offer the next driver for the next leg of travels.

Insecurity and harassment from authorities is a constant concern. For me, northern Algeria was a danger zone as there have been terrorist attacks aimed at foreigners recently. The authorities constantly asked for my papers: at road blocks, bus stations and along the streets. Furthermore, the looks I was receiving from young, unemployed men on the streets in Tébessa and Constantine where enough to push me further towards my goal of returning to Niger. I was a target there.

For Black Africans, the Sahara (southern Algeria) is problematic. Starting in Biskra, Algeria (the northern frontier of the Sahara) the authorities began to ask for the papers of anyone resembling Black Africans on the buses and other forms of transportation. In most cases, those who do not have their papers in order are pulled off the bus. In rare cases, a few have the chance to pay a small gift to avoid being deported. At the frontier town of In Guezzam as I was going through the formalities of crossing into Niger, I witnessed the scale of this operation. Large Mercedes freight trucks rolled by with hundreds of illegal aliens standing up in the truck beds to be dropped off in Assamakka, Niger. I estimated around 250-300 per truck from the way people were lined up.

Assamakka is a Kel Tamasheq name and actually a famous water source for their animals. There is a legend around it where in the past; a traveler who had been suffering from thirst for days arrived here at night and saw the well thanks to the moonlight reflecting off the surface of the water (the definition of Assamakka). So excited he was, that he rushed over to quench his thirst and tragically fell into the well and drowned. There is of course, a moral here and any Tamasheq who suffers from thirst or hunger will only take a small amount of water or food to begin with once they have arrived to safety.

Assamakka has transformed considerably since its days as a source of water for caravans and legend for practicing patience. There are small restaurants opened by Black African women, little ‘informal’ markets selling cheap goods from Algeria and furthermore the village is swollen with Africans from Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo, Benin and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. There is ongoing theft, hustles and cons. But more overwhelming than the crimes that take place in the corners of the town are the rows of illegal aliens from Algeria. It was intimidating when I arrived to the control. They looked like army divisions standing in formation, thanks to their Algerian overseers.

If the large Mercedes trucks and the way Africans were lined up in them is not enough to recall the diagrams of slave ships from the 17th-19th centuries, perhaps the collective transport between Assamakka and Arlit will recall the image. The transport is a Toyota Land Cruiser, from the early 1990s, with the back seats removed in order to fit as many people as possible into the vehicle. The driver and the front seats remain, but the cost is double to sit up in front with the driver (which most Africans cannot afford, especially if they have just been deported from Algeria). The ‘back’ becomes full at about 14 or 15 people. Exhaust from the vehicle and dust kicked up from the tires enters through the back window. The distance between the two towns is about 210 km and the road is sometimes sand, sometimes rock. Ideally, the voyage should take 4 to 5 hours but the vehicle I was in had flat tires constantly and since there is a rebellion on hold in the region, a curfew in Arlit prevented my arrival into town the same day I left Assamakka. We slept about 40 km from the town, which was actually refreshing considering the lack of leg room. I arrived in Arlit the next day: dirty, unshaven, bruised from the transport and my companions had to carry me out of the back of the cab for a 20 minute rest in orer for the blood to return to my legs (I had lost feeling of my legs several times during the travel).

In all fairness to Algerian authorities and those who have created enterprises around clandestine operations, no one forces Africans from Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo, Benin and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa to make this crossing, unless one wishes to personify poverty. Ask any illegal alien in Europe/North Africa or those deported back to Mali or Niger why they cross the Sahara and they will tell you, "There is nothing for me back in -choose a sub-Saharan African country and place here-" The conditions one experiences in traveling through the Sahara illegally are miserable and geared to maximize the returns for entrepreneurs running transport. It is an abuse of human rights, but one that Black Africans choose to enter considering their lack of opportunities at home.

Cultural Misunderstandings and Theft

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Sun, 23 Sep 2007 08:20:00 +0000

I am in Tunisia right now making my way gradually down to Algeria, and back into Niger. Part of the reason why I ended up here has to do with modest means for transport. I don’t mean to be cryptic, this is just a polite way of saying I am doing my best to budget and stretch out my finances.

Whenever I have the chance to meet up with a family of herders, though, I do my best to visit and communicate with them. They are, after all, the subjects of my study and I am always interested in hearing what they have to say about their lives and other information they wish to share. I met up with a family just outside of Gaafour, Tunisia. And at first, I did not even know that they were herders but the son and the father who talked to me first were very welcoming and invited me to stay at their tent for the night, the night before Ramadan started. I figured why not?

They were nice but I had noticed one of the sons was a little too nice. When I left the camp the next morning, he followed me to the road and was playing with things on my sack, like a map I had tacked away in a pocket and my 5-liter water container that was hanging on a belt clip (empty, but as I go farther south, it will be filled and used). This experience would haunt me later.

I made it to this town called El Aroussa. There, I was befriended by three Tunisians by the names of Mohammed, Brahim and Hassan. They are a little more older than I, but Brahim lived and worked in France for 5 years and Hassan is well-educated so this gave me a chance to learn more about Tunisia. It was the first night of Ramadan so they insisted that I stay and break it with them. I couldn’t refuse and why would I? The food was phenomenal!

The next day, I had plans to move on but when I prepared I noticed my GPS was missing. I thought, where did I leave it? I retraced all my actions from Gaafour to here. And this is when I thought of the son of the pastoral family. Could he really have taken it? I remember when I shook his hand before he left me to continue my walk, he wouldn’t even look me in the face. The more I thought about it, the more I realized, he took it.

So I went back to the camp. He had left with his father to Tunis, but the mother and sisters explained that they were going to return the next day. I gave the kid the benefit of the doubt at first, looking around the trail where I was walking the day before and telling the family, it is likely, it dropped from my sack. The mother and girls of the camp said they did not know if their brother had found anything and the other brother said he did not know either. I wasn’t ready to give up.

When I went back, I explained things to Mohammed, Brahim and Hassan. They were very, very suspicious and Mohammed told me to wait another day so we could go back and investigate. The next day, Hassan drove Mohammed and I to the camp. We arrived there right when the father and son had returned, though I did not see the younger son, the one who was playing with my sack a couple of days before. Mohammed talked to the father and when we went back the paved road, Mohammed saw someone he knew driving the way towards El Aroussa and asked that he drive me back there while Mohammed continued ‘the investigation.’ I went back and waited. A couple of hours later, Mohammed shows up with my GPS unit in his hand, the batteries drained, but in good shape. He had to call on the police as the family was denying having it but once police show up at the tent, the device became ‘found.’

I am not angry at the events that passed because it has only made more cautious of my possessions but there is a cultural misunderstanding between both the family and I. They, for the most part, saw me as a tourist without the time to wait and retrieve my device and hence denied having possession of it. I like to believe that I can simply walk into a camp of pastoralists, explain my mission and walk out with the information I am inquiring about. But that is not reality. Even if I only walked into the camp with some pens and paper that is more than what they posses and some, by temptation, will try to beg, borrow or steal that possession from me. I offer a word of warning to those doing research in developing nations. Even though they know it is wrong, the temptation to take what you carry into their tent is there and must be discouraged in a diplomatic fashion or in cases such as this one, met with force.

Panaceas and Buzz Words

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Thu, 30 Aug 2007 10:57:00 +0000

I recently attended a United Nations Conference in Vienna thanks to an opportunity someone offered to me. It was rushed and I wish I had more time but I did my best to sit in on forums that were relevant to phenomena that I witnessed during my stay in Mali, particularly policy workers promoting decentralization and governmental reform in developing nations. The following are notes and comments I drew up while attending these meetings.

The dialogue and rhetoric in many people’s speeches had the tendency to rely on certain buzz words or phrases such as ‘marginalized’ and ‘most vulnerable’ instead of using the simplistic word ‘poor.’ Regarding the efforts to improve conditions for the ‘marginalized’ and ‘most vulnerable’ the orators were using concepts such as ‘civil society,’ ‘good governance,’ ‘transparency,’ ‘capacity building,’ and ‘up-scaling knowledge.’ To make things simple to the layman, this rhetoric was used in the promotion of decentralization, handing the decision-making processes and financing for development and regional planning to local communities. It is a practice that most countries around the world are at least talking about if not implementing and part of aid package programs that come from industrialized nations and international aid agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Decentralization, however, is not a panacea, a cure-all for the ills of corruption, stagnation in development and the improvement of infrastructure, health, education and other opportunities to local peoples. Malians I had interviewed or became friends with had cynically commented that local leaders organizing and making new communities are the latest con men in their society. Yet, speakers at the conference talked of the importance of decentralization and threw in buzz words like ‘civil society’ to promote it. A few at the conference, however, such as Kumi Naidoo, a South African NGO worker, asked participants to take a deeper, critical look at these concepts and how they affect people worldwide. For example, ‘civil society’ is not always a positive in every circumstance. Examples where this is a negative for local people are the Ku Klux Klan in the United States or Interahamwe in the Rwandan genocide of the 1990s, both voluntary societies with goals and membership.

In addition to the eloquent points Kumi Naidoo brought up I would also like to add the most important point he emphasized during his speech. In the United Nations, there are many countries signing treaties to end conflicts and arms proliferation; fight world poverty; improve human rights particularly for women; conserve natural resources and protect the environment but few nations, both industrialized and developing, comply with these treaties. If the United Nations has a future role in providing a forum where countries and different groups meet to argue, debate and compromise on political, economic, social, and environmental issues there has to be more than panaceas and buzz words at these forums. There has to be compliance and accountability for those who break the treaties that they sign.

Findings in Mali

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Sat, 14 Jul 2007 16:50:00 +0000

The following is my findings duirng my reserch in the region of Gao, Mali that I submitted to the Ministry of Education in Bamako, Mali this past June. I apologize if one has a difficult time understanding French or perhaps my use of it but I saw it as necessary to submit my findings in the French language for Malian officials who are interested in my research.

RAPPORT DE MISSION

La Sécurité Alimentaire Chez Bergers/Pasteurs Dans la Région du Gao

- 20 Novembre 2006 jusqu’au 31 May 2007 –

Franklin Graham

(Autorisation de Recherche n° 067/2006 – MEN/CNRST)

J’ai effectué 262 interviews aux localités autour la région du Gao « spécifiquement 104 à Gao ; 76 à Ménaka ; 26 à Tidarmène ; 25 à Tacharane ; 23 à Tin Abao et 8 à Emnaghuil ». Ma recherche porte sur le sujet des moyens d’existence chez bergers/pasteurs à partir de l’année 1968 jusqu’au présent. J’ai adressé des questions tel que : Comment les choix des bergers/pasteurs ont changé depuis les années 1960s et quelles sont les conséquences des ces changements sur la sécurité alimentaire.

Les Différences Entre Les Sites de la Recherche

C’est évident chaque éleveur fait face aux défis différents à la mode de vie. Mais on peut estimer la vulnérabilité de la sécurité alimentaire par regarder comment la mode de vie a changé durant les crises des sècheresses de 1973 et 1984 et la rébellion. J’observais un peu des tendances qu’existent au même endroit et ces tendances révèlent directions possibles à diminuer la risque de la famine et s’améliorer la sécurité alimentaire pour la région du Gao.
Les éleveurs à Gao partagent généralement le même problème. Le coût d’entretenir les cheptels est cher. L’eau est difficile de trouver pour les habitants de banlieue et pour tout le monde les aliments du bétail sont très cher pendant la saison soudure. De nos jours, il y a une service moins cher par mois où d’un berger conduit des animaux durant les jours, mais ce système ne satisfait pas touts les besoins de nourrir les animaux. Le gens doit payer pour les aliments du bétail. Quelqu’un vend des têtes de trouver les moyens de les acheter. Les autres ne mangent rien deux ou trois jours chaque semaine d’économiser et les garder. Durant la longue durée d'une vie ça résulte dans sous-alimentes. Le gens qui n’a pas les moyens de vacciner les animaux fait un risque. Les cheptels en ville ne circulent souvent et n’ont pas la même résistance des malades comme les troupeaux en brousse. Quelqu’un voit leur troupeau diminue chaque année à cause des malades.
A Tacharane « un village 25 km sud-est de Gao » le défi pour les habitants qui fait l’élevage est la santé des animaux. Quelqu’un vaccine leur troupeau chaque année. Le reste trouve l’assistance des organisations non gouvernementales ou l’état ou l’armée américaine qui viennent de vacciner des bêtes. Mais le problème de santé des cheptels tient. Les individuels qui possède plusieurs têtes emploie un, deux ou trois bergers par saison d’utiliser les pâturages au Haoussa [la région occidentale] durant la saison froide et le Gourma [la région orientale] durant la saison soudure. Néanmoins ils perdent des têtes à la fin d’hivernage et pendant la saison soudure. Les autres qu’ont moins de dix têtes et font une ferme d’élevage ont été lentement perdu cet activité parce qu’ils n’ont pas les moyens à remplacer les têtes perdues.
Emnaghuil est un village 40 km nord-est de Gao. Avant la sècheresse de 1973 le village n’est pas existé mais après la crise les éleveurs y sont graduellement installés. Là-bas le grand menace pour la mode de vie et en suite la sécurité alimentaire est la destruction de la base des ressources naturelles. Les résidents ont remarqué la quantité et la qualité des arbres locaux c’est diminué depuis les années 1970s. Plus important les sources d’eau sont limité et ceux qu’est exploité sont en train de disparaître. La nouvelle construction des bâtiments au marché et le transport de Gao amènent les aliments au village mais les résidents n’ont plus l’argent à acheter les condiments extérieurs. Quand on voit l’avenir le gens n’aura pas le choix sauf à vendre les animaux ou déménager à autre lieu.
Les habitants de Ménaka ont discuté que les politiques locaux limitent leur accès aux ressources naturelles. En raison des politiques des éleveurs ont construit leurs maisons à Ménaka-ville mais ils restent en brousse plusieurs de temps d’éviter des taxes. Le reste essaie à diversifier la mode de vie par faire le pêcheur, le commerce et l’agriculture mais ces activités sont limités par politiques aussi. En plus certains ont expliqué le problème de prestige s’affecte la sécurité alimentaire des familles à la région. Les questions qu’on pose au gens ne lient pas à ce phénomène mais des personnes ont franchement dit que leurs égaux mangent mal pour garder les gros troupeaux.
Tidarmène « un village 120 km nord de Ménaka » s’est devenu un lieu de concurrence entre les habitants. Plusieurs organisations non gouvernementales marchent dans le village, y compris Zébu Azawack, OXFAM et PADENEM. Ils y sont venus à développer le secteur pastoral mais un peu des familles recevaient les bénéfices. Certains éleveurs regardent tellement l’aide des organisations non gouvernementales comme le népotisme et ils ne confient ni organisations non gouvernementales ni l’état. C’est possible cet aliénation s’est expliqué le lancement de la rébellion dans la région a 1990. Quand même la majorité porte la même mode de vie comme les générations avant les sècheresses et la rébellion : principalement l’élevage et deuxième le commerce.
Tin Abao et les villages voisins tel que In Gouyas et Inkiringiya sont 20 à 25 km sud-est de Ménaka. Les résidents ont diversifié leurs moyens d’existence partialement à cause des sècheresses et la rébellion et partialement à cause des projets des organisations non gouvernementales. Ces organisations ont encouragé la diversité des activités par amener l’assistance dans le domaine d’agriculture et autres métiers aux habitants. Le gens sème et récolte des légumes tel que la salade, la tomate et le concombre. Dans l’idéal un villageois peut vendre les légumes pour l’argent d’acheter les grains mais on est dépendant sur des commerçants qui passent les villages durant la saison froide. Parfois ils les ont vendu, parfois ils les ont consommé. La consommation des légumes par les résidents est seulement un bénéfice temporaire parce qu’ils diversifient leurs régimes alimentaires mais à la longue durée c’est une perte parce que le temps et le travail pouvaient aurais réparti à l’activité principale dans la région : l’élevage. C’est observé que l’élevage est en train de diminuer en importance comme le gens déplace leurs efforts aux l’agriculture, le commerce ou autres modes de vie.

La Tendance Entre Les Sites de la Recherche

Chaque lieu possède des caractéristiques qui sont unique et individuel mais au même temps il y a une tendance entre les villes et villages dans la région du Gao. Le gouvernement malien, les organisations non gouvernementales, la banque mondiale, et individuels qui donne financement et/ou l’assistance technique à la région poussent les éleveurs locales dans un système monétaire et se les forcent s’installer dans les endroits. Quelque assistance encourage la commercialisation et spécialisation d’élevage au le même temps les autres se l’opposent par à promouvoir la diversité de la mode de vie. Mais tous les acteurs dans le domaine de développement sont influencés les pasteurs/bergers d’utiliser l’argent dans leurs échanges et pour eux à résider le même endroit.
L’avantage d’un système monétaire est un universel méthode de changement entre les marchandises et les services. Les alternatives sont un système de la solidarité et un système d’échange sans l’argent. Les règles et les conditions ne sont pas les mêmes entre le gens ou les lieux donc quelqu’un préfère un système monétaire. En plus les avantages pour le gens qui sont fixé le même endroit sont la normalisation des noms pour endroits et meilleurs moyens de communication. Quand peuple sont constamment mobile il n’y a pas un nom fixé pour un endroit parce qu’autres s’appelle le même endroit un nom différent. En plus les langues et moyens de communication varient entres les groupes quand ils déménagent toujours. Donc, les organisations d’aide essayent à créer les universels pour les éleveurs dans cette région.
Le désavantage avec un système monétaire est les inégalités que déjà existe dans l’économie malienne. Souvent les éleveurs sont illettrés et ils ne comprennent bien le système monétaire. Un peu des commerçants les profitent durant les échanges et la suite de la perte, les éleveurs vont retourner aux systèmes de la solidarité et les changements sans l’argent. Le désavantage avec la sédentarisation des éleveurs est la gestion des ressources naturelles. Autrefois, les éleveurs connaissent un système de conserver les ressources naturelles quand ils circulent à la campagne mais de nos jours ils sont responsables pour le déboisement de localités où ils sont fixés. Donc ceux qui veulent rester le même lieu ont besoins d’apprendre un nouveau système de gestion les ressources naturelles.

Objectifs Scientifiques

L’objectif principal de cette recherche est pour on rédige un thèse doctorat. Pendant la recherche j’ai partagé mes observations avec la communauté d’organisation non gouvernementale et les autres qui travaillent dans le domaine de développement a la région de Gao. Cette année et la prochaine année je vais écrire deux articles scientifiques pour les journaux académiques. Cette recherche est la première partie de la recherche pour une subvention de « National Science Foundation », n° BCS-0622892. La deuxième partie de la recherche va effectuer au Niger commencent en Septembre cette année. A l’avenir, je voudrais retourner à Gao et Ménaka d’étudier la relation entre les activités pastoraux et la gestion des ressources naturelles.

Violence in the North

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Wed, 23 May 2007 11:37:00 +0000

When I interview people regarding the rebellion that took place in the 1990s [and if they are old enough the 1960s], I usually receive one of two responses. One, that the rebels were just a bunch of bandits [which was partially true as some people did take advantage of the situation and used assault rifles to extort money and animals from people in the countryside] and second, that the rebels were the sons of herders. This rings true for at least the start of the rebellion in the 1990s as Touareg and Arab leaders amassed arms to attack military installations in the Tombouctou and Gao regions. The first attack which took place north of Ménaka was in a valley called I-n-Teidenni which is the source of water for animals and herding families during the rainy season and pasture in the drier months. When I return to Bamako and look in the archives for the events of the 1960s rebellion, I suspect its commencement will have been in one of the valleys that some of my interviewees use for maintaining their flocks.

I bring up this point because I was told that yesterday that an attack took place about 450 km from where I am in Gao. One of the rebel Touareg leaders, named Ibrahim Bahanga is not in agreement with the recently re-elected president, Amadou Toumani Touré , saying that he has failed to honour the agreements of the peace accords. Bahanga and his supporters attacked a military post at Tin Zowetin [Algerian-Malian border] on Thursday night. I have noticed a change in the daily activity as there are more military vehicles heading north and more military people circulating around Gao. It is hard to tell at this point, however, if there will be further attacks or if Bahanga is using this incident to draw Amadou Toamni Touré to the bargaining table once again. One thing is certain, though. The sons of herders are helping Bahanga in this attack as they have in previous times. If the violence continues, I fear what this means for the greater pastoral community in the north. In the past during turbulent periods like this, they have been the victims of banditry, military interrogation and harassment, in addition to greater acts of violence committed by both sides.

Presidential Elections

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Sat, 05 May 2007 08:47:00 +0000

In two weeks I will be returning to Bamako and sharing my findings in this blog as I write up a report for the Ministry of Education. But for now, here are my observations from the recent election this past Sunday.

Mali just finished up their presidential election. From my observations, there were two major problems. Poor voter turnout was one problem. In some regions only 25% of the eligible voters turned out. I bumped into friends on the street who told me they were not going to vote either because they did not have the chance to return to their villages where they had their registration cards or out of simple apathy [it is sad to see this as I am accustomed to voter apathy in my own country].

The other problem and one that should be taken seriously is the limitations of democracy in African countries. The candidates who have the means to publicize and tour the country are going to have a considerable advantage over candidates that do not have the finances, more so than in western democracies as Africans still lack opportunities in education. Amadou Toumani Touré spent at least twice more than his close contender, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and after these two the other candidates had very limited exposure to Malian citizens.

Mali is a multiparty democracy but look at the changes since 2002. In 2002, 24 different political parties ran for the presidency. Perhaps this number was excessively gross for voters but this year, 8 political parties campaigned. How many choices will there be in 2012? From Amadou Toumani Touré’s success in gaining a second term I regret that the choices will be greatly reduced from few to one. Should money decide political direction? That is not democracy.

I had little chance to look at press coverage of the candidates while doing my research here in Gao but from what little I saw, they appeared to give candidates equal time on the news programs. That is certainly progress. However, very few Malians have the means or opportunity to see the news. In addition, outside of Bamako and major cities, few Malians are fluent in French. Questions posed to the candidates were all given in French. Using an African language is out of the question as it will create ethnic divisions in Mali. Still, broadcasts in French do exclude many walks of life in Mali, particularly the older generations and people living in the countryside.

In my opinion, Amadou Toumani Touré did everything legal and exercised his right to run for, campaign and win voters in this past election. But one cannot ignore the limitations and restrictions that other candidates had during this previous election. Political practice still needs work in Mali and perhaps during Amadou Toumani Touré’s second term there can be reforms in campaign spending, improvements in voter registration and educational reform. From my point of view, democracy has not reached Mali just yet.

Open Letter to an NGO Worker

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Fri, 13 Apr 2007 08:34:00 +0000

I have the unpleasant task of addressing foreigners who work for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Africa in this posting. I have had numerous pleasant experiences with this group as they are often a source of information, they have helped me out with rides to remote regions and in the process they have become some of my friends. Regretfully, however it will appear as if I am biting the hand that helps with the following words.

I beg of any and all people who come from Europe, Asia and the Americas and come to Africa to engage in development work to tone down the lifestyle that you bring to Africa. Aside from tourists, NGO workers are the only contact many Africans have with outsiders and overwhelmingly the image that they receive is that everyone in the “West” is rich, happy and content with the food products, the services and the latest technologies and gadgets. I am not going to ignore the fact that the material wealth of other regions of the world compared to Africa is unquestionably biased and unequal, but the way in which strangers live in Africa is often seen as superior, while anything that is local is perceived as inferior. That is a great error as there are food products, services and information that are just as good if not better then their equivalents in the West.

Africans, however, are neglecting or rejecting their local resources, services and information to pursue the lifestyle that foreigners bring with them, a lifestyle that they perceive all citizens have in France, the United States, Germany, Japan or other industrialized countries. As an example, I met a Peace Corps volunteer in Guinea-Conakry working in the health sector back in 2001 who was frustrated that local people preferred buying expensive, imported powdered milk instead of using inexpensive local milk that came from goats and cows. I understood her frustration as I had tasted the dairy products in the countryside. It was without a doubt, the best milk and yoghurt I ever ate.

In terms of toning down one’s lifestyle, I do expect that foreigners maintain routines that keep them healthy and productive. If more foreigners however were walking or taking public transportation instead of driving on their motorbikes or cars into the communities where they are working; if Africans saw us drinking and eating local foods that are known to be safe instead of drinking bottled imported sodas and packaged processed foods and if we greeted in local languages instead of a reliance on French, English and Portuguese all the time, in my opinion this could increase the success stories in Africa contrary to the many misunderstandings that pass in development work.

There are obstacles and challenges to what I am proposing, that is clear. But there has to be a start and I suggest to anyone starting a career or long stint in Africa to reflect on how their actions and choices are perceived by local peoples. Trying to break the perception that the “West” is superior is a futile fight in my own experience but the decisions I make regarding transportation, alimentation, lodging and social interaction with Africans are a compromise between maintaining my health and well-being and using local products, services and information. Yes, the “West” has the latest technologies but there are lessons on both sides of the fence that need to be transmitted by both Africans and strangers in development work.

Food Security Issues in Kidal, Mali

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Tue, 27 Mar 2007 08:51:00 +0000

The region of Kidal, Mali was originally the first research site of this grant. After a site visit and conversations with local officials there, I chose to shift the first research site to the regions of Gao and Ménaka, Mali. The change comes from the curfew that still exists in Kidal after a few skirmishes between the Malian military and a Touareg separatist group in northeastern Mali, and the restriction of mobility around the smaller communes of Kidal. The following notes are from my visits to the Kidal region and were shared with those in attendance at the 17th Sahel Workshop in Grève, Denmark, November 5th and 6th, 2006.

Food production has declined in Mali, once an exporter of food and now importing grains and other produce from neighboring countries. Literature since the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s has pointed towards a decline in herding and farming as livelihoods and more people shifting into wage labor activities. Recent studies, however, have suggested resurgence in people returning to the land as urban problems and insecurity in wage labor jobs, like mining, have had little appeal to some. Still, returning to farms, flocks and grasslands today is not without its difficulties. The ecology in some regions has altered due to the abandonment fields and pastures during droughts and civil conflicts, urbanization and the competition between urban consumption and local resource management, and also the establishment of natural reserves and parks has reduced the former commons, creating competition between various groups using this natural resource base.

Opinions vary on the definition of food security, but many agree that food production, distribution and markets, cultural and regional preferences and political stability carry great importance in food procurement for a region. Food availability [distribution and markets] is the focus of this paper. Other factors are not less important, they were not possible to investigate considering the time constraints. In terms of peoples’ responses to food scarcity, Africans had a range of strategies ranging from migrations to other regions, collection of wild foods and hunting to a reliance on social, economic and kinship relations between various groups such as the collection of tithes or debts. Investigating the changes in peoples’ responses to food shortage is important, not only to understand the community’s link with the other local communities and external agents involved in the region, but also to provide policy makers effective options to reduce vulnerability to famine and malnutrition.

Kidal is both a town and region in northeastern Mali that has been a challenge to integrate into the Malian state and aid during times of food shortages or political crises. After the rebellion in the 1990s and as part of negotiations that took place between the Bamako and rebel leaders, Kidal became the eighth region, equal and competing for national resources and financing with Mali’s other regions. One could argue at present that political stability in the region is the greatest factor contributing to alimentation but as mentioned before there was not enough time to effectively look at linkages between food security and political stability.

Certain markets and products fare better than others in Kidal. First and foremost, local markets bring dairy products, meat and forage for animals into the markets of Kidal. These products, for the most part are either equal or lower in cost than their counterparts in Gao or Bamako. Transportation costs are minimal if not non-existent for these products. The gardens in the southern part of town provide vegetables from January through March but often their production and seasonality is not satisfactory for local demand. To compensate, there is a weak national market where Bambara and Songhaï families import grains and vegetables from southern parts of Mali. Individuals as far as Sikasso travel back and forth to bring fruits and vegetables to this northern market.

The intraregional black market is a large provider of food and other products for Kidal. Canned goods, grains, bottled juices and water are much cheaper in neighboring Algeria and entrepreneurs both Malian and clandestine that have been deported [often Nigerian nationality] use their connections in Algeria to import non-perishable food and other products into the region. Vendors selling goods smuggled in from Algeria called their activities “les petites choses” but their contribution to food availability is certainly not small.

Some foods are exported from the region but overwhelmingly this is livestock because prices for animals are higher in Algeria and Niger compared to markets in Mali. Vegetables must be high in quality and appearance for regional traders to ship them off to higher-priced markets in southern Mali. Even dates which are produced in Kidal stay in the region as demand exceeds supply. To compensate for this demand, Algerian dates are found in the market more often than locally produced dates.

In conclusion, food availability and prices are relatively better here than in other parts of Mali. Exceptions to this generalization are fresh fruits, vegetables and grains as transportation increases costs and restrict the availability of these foods. Other exceptions involve periods of political crises where transportation of goods from Algeria is both difficult and dangerous. The prices of food goods increased during the rebellion and the recent skirmishes that took place last year in April. Markets fluctuate in their strength but community members and their ties to southern Mali bring in fresh produce from the south seasonally. More important, clandestine groups and locals with ties to Algeria bring in non perishable goods all year long, an essential for the region’s food security.

There are areas for further research here. Interviews with clandestine peoples and their contributions to the communities they now reside in holds promise in uncovering the trade networks and food availability in Kidal as well as other towns in the crossroads of illegal immigration, like Arlit, Niger, Tamanrasset, Algeria and Ghent, Libya. Research will not be easy as these groups have experienced incidents of violence, rape, torture, discrimination, robbery and other atrocities, sometimes at the hands of locals, other times at the hands of authorities, guides or their own kind. Yet understanding their role in these communities is crucial, both to repatriate those who wish to return home at some future point and to integrate those who have made the Saharan trading centre their home. Illegal immigration is detrimental and counter productive for both individuals and countries and must be ended at least for ethical reasons. But to push forward and repatriate people without understanding their contributions to the local community and ignore individual choice in remaining in the Saharan towns will only contribute to further hardship. This paper recommends academics and policy makers to learn more about these new merchants in the Saharan trade.

Wall of Gris-gris

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Sat, 06 Jan 2007 08:17:00 +0000

I am in the middle of conducting my interviews with pastoralists in the Gao Region of Mali but with this posting I wished to share with everyone the bizarre experience I had conducting formalities with the local authorities when I started my research in December. I will catch up to the present and share with you some of the findings I have with food security issues among pastoralists but for now, enjoy this anecdote.

When one walks into the Sergeant’s office at the Gao Police Station, it is difficult to avoid the sight of Gris-gris hanging on a green board facing the entrance. For those who are not aware of what Gris-gris are, they are talismans that many Africans wear to protect them from a variety of things such as bad luck, sorcerers, evil and ill health. Gris-gris originally come from African indigenous religions but the practice has also carried on into both Islam and Christian faiths. With Gris-gris used by Muslims, often the talisman is a leather pouch or pocket that contains an Ayat (Chapter or verse) of the Quran. There are some Africans that do not wear Gris-gris, but in Islam they are known as the Du’at, the reactionaries. Many Muslim Africans, whether they have Berber, Arab or African origins, wear Gris-gris.

What is a little haunting and certainly interesting about this wall is that the Gris-gris come from people who have been arrested, incarcerated and in some cases killed by the local authorities over the past twenty years. Notice the Gris-gris on the bottom, second on the left. It is a toy gun from either a G.I. Joe or other military action figure. Obviously this was a talisman for a rebel either caught or slain in the Touareg Rebellion of 1990-1994. Suspects’ rights are certainly different in Africa as compared to those in Europe or North America, so items such as these are removed and in the case of Gao displayed for the public to see. Perhaps this is a warning to those who break the laws or challenge the authority of the State.

When tourists come to Gao, Timbuktu, or other major draws in Mali and the larger region of West Africa, local artisans do their best to sell brightly colored Gris-gris to them, often with vivid dyes of green, blue, red and yellow. Notice in the photo the simplicity of Gris-gris worn by Africans. They are most often brown or black depending on the nature of the leather used in making the talismans. But then for the tourists the Gris-gris have another purpose, to be the souvenir of an African trip and not the protective talisman that Africans use it for.

Notes from the 17th Sahel Workshop, Grève, Denmark, 6th-7th November 2006

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Sat, 23 Dec 2006 09:04:00 +0000

The following are notes that were taken in attending the conference a month ago. People were confused as to why an American, let along someone from West Virginia University was in attendance. I imagine they do not have that many people from the USA coming to Denmark in the middle of winter, let alone studying West Africa issues.

Suggestions for development strategies and Identification of Research Priorities in the Sahel

Will pastoral legislation disenfranchise pastoralists in the Sahel? Recently, many laws have been passed in West African countries. For example, Principes d’Orientations du Code Rural in Niger (1993); Code Pastoral in Guinea (1995); Code Pastoral in Mauritania (2000); Charte Pastorale in Mali (2001); Loi d’Orientation Relative au Pastoralisme in Burkina Faso (2002); and once again in Niger, Loi Pastorale (in Progress). These laws have not been completely defined or placed into practice, partially because of lack of funding and also from conflicts they have with other laws in these countries regarding water and land codes. It was suggested as the conference that local conventions and meetings to decide local resource management should take place but of course, these involves more resource and there are likely to be winners and losers depending on those who are in attendance and those who are not.

Which type of pastoralism should receive support, nomadic activity, transhumance or ranching? Some in attendance made the powerful argument that ranching should be supported and is the developing trend in West Africa as it aids in the food security of a growing population. Others, recognizing the importance of pastoralism as a livelihood system and a practical method of exploiting resources in arid and semi-arid regions did not agree. In either case, there are often conflicts in what is the domaine collectif (common property) and other types of property systems such as private and customary.

What importance do market systems have in identifying problems among the poor, women and pastoral groups? How markets work in Africa is still underrepresented in literature on West Africa. Literature that has addressed market issues often looks at problems among the poor, women and pastoral groups. Problems should be identified and studied but equal attention should be taken in identifying and understanding what is working in regards to market systems. If there is work done to understand the achievements in market systems then there are solutions that can be offered by policy makers and academics in the field of West African development.

What trends in research should be taken? What linkages exist between the urban and rural areas certainly needs more clarification, especially since there is a growing trend of political decentralization but growing centralization in national economies and societies. Capitals are making efforts to place more development decisions in the hands of local administrations but more people are moving to the capitals and goods and services follow to supply demand. Understanding all linkages from the local to the international can assist in policies taken to manage development projects, economies and demographic issues.

Authorization for Research in Gao and Ménaka

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Mon, 20 Nov 2006 11:56:00 +0000

The following is the manuscript that I used to request authorization from la Centre Nationale de Recherche Scientifique et Technologie in Bamako. If you are well-versed in French, you will have no problem.

Le Ministère de l’Education Nationale
Centre Nationale de Recherche Scientifique et Technologie (CNRST)
Bamako
Mali

Le 20 Novembre 2006

Chers Mesdames et Messieurs. Le présent document est une manuscrite pour vous demander de l’autorisation d’effectuer de la recherche au Mali. M. Franklin Graham, un étudiant au doctorat à West Virginia University aux Etats-Unis, est la personne qui vous demande pour l’autorisation.

Sujet : Le Thème de la Recherche

Chers Mesdames et Messieurs. Je voudrais effectuer de la recherche au Mali. Ma recherche porte sur le sujet de la sécurité alimentaire chez pasteurs/bergers. Je voudrais étudier les choix du mode de vie chez des pasteurs/bergers de cette région. Spécifiquement, je vais adresser des questions tels que : comment les choix des pasteurs/bergers ont changé depuis les années 1960s et quelles sont les conséquences des ces changements sur la sécurité alimentaire.

Sujet : Le Cadre de la Recherche

Chers Mesdames et Messieurs. Cette recherche s’inscrit dans le cadre d’une thèse que j’ai besoin d’accomplir pour que je puisse compléter mes études de doctorat. Sachez bien que je serai à votre disposition pour partager avec votre Ministère les constatations et résultats scientifiques de ma recherche. Mais, pour le moment, le but principal est de me permettre effectuer de la recherche pour accomplir la thèse.

Sujet : Le Site Géographique de la Prospection

Chers Mesdames et Messieurs. Avec votre autorisation et l’autorisation des officiers et chefs des tribus, je vais effectuer de la recherche à Gao ainsi que les communes autour de la ville. Par exemple, il y a une commune de touareg qui s’appelle Djieboek, située à 45 km de Gao. Mon collaborateur m’a dit que cette commune et autres autour de Gao sont convenables pour les études portant sur la sécurité alimentaire.

Sujet : La Période de la Recherche

Chers Mesdames et Messieurs. Avec votre autorisation et l’autorisation des officiers et chefs des tribus, je vais effectuer de la recherche à Gao et dans les communes autour de la ville tout au long de la période qui s’étale du fin de Novembre 2006 jusqu’au fin de Mai 2007.

Sujet : Le Résumé de la Thèse

Chers Mesdames et Messieurs. Ma thèse est une étude académique pour concrétiser ces principaux objectifs : identifier et analyser les causes et les problèmes de la sécurité alimentaire, comprendre les stratégies que les bergers/pasteurs utilisent pour surpasser et survivre une crise alimentaire, et discerner le rôle et l’importance de l’État ainsi que les Organisations Non Gouvernementales en matière d’apporter de l’aide aux bergers/pasteurs pendants les périodes de crise.

A mon avis, je pense que le mode de vie est l’indicateur principal pour connaître et comprendre les challenges que les bergers/pasteurs font face durant la sécurité alimentaire. Les bergers/pasteurs qui ont abandonnées l’élevage après les sècheresses des années de 1970 et 1980 pour faire autres travaux ont choisi un mode différent de vie par rapport aux autres qui continuent encore à faire de l’élevage pour gagner leurs vies. Malheureusement, les bergers/pasteurs sont dépendent de l’assistance des ONGs ou le gouvernement ; par conséquent, leur modes des vies ont été effectues par l’assistance. En plus, les bergers qui ont délaissées l’élevage pourraient retourner à cette activité d’une manière permanente ou d’une manière saisonnière. Connaître et comprendre les différents modes de vies chez les pasteurs/bergers va nous révéler la direction les gens suivent pour affranchir les prochaines crises alimentaires et va également aider les ONG à bien améliorer leurs programmes d’assistances humanitaire.

Sujet : La Méthodologie de la Thèse

Chers Mesdames et Messieurs. Pour effectuer ma recherche, je vais procéder par des étapes prè- définies. Premièrement, après avoir reçu l’autorisation des chefs des tribus, je vais leur poser la question, "Qu'est ce qu'ils ont changé depuis les 1960s?" Je vais les inviter et encourager à m’expliquer les changements. Je vais noter leurs réponses. Ces réponses sont importantes pour ma recherche parce qu’elles vont me permettre d’élaborer mes questionnaires.

Par la suite, je vais lancer mon sondage : je vais administrer les questionnaires dans la ville de Gao et spécifiquement dans les quartiers où les bergers actuellement résident. D’habitude, ils habitent dans la banlieue ou à côté du marché du bétail. Avec l’aide d’un traducteur, je vais poser des questions directement liées à leurs modes de vie.

L’étape suivante est d’interviewer les bergers qui ont répondu aux questionnaires. Les interviews contiennent des questions spécifiques aux bergers/pasteurs. Comme la première étape, je vais enregistrer les interviews pour documenter les commentaires exprimés.

Finalement, moi et mon traducteur allons procéder à visiter les communes des bergers/pasteurs autour de la ville pour faire les interviews. Les questions de ces interviews vont être similaires aux interviews effectuées dans la ville de Gao ; mais je vais personnaliser les questions aux besoins et problèmes respectifs aux communes quand c’est nécessaire.

Sujet : Mon Collaborateur et Mes Contacts

Chers Mesdames et Messieurs. M. Meol Lamine Bossu est mon collaborateur à Gao. Il travaille au Gouvernât et parfois il aide des bergers peulhs avec des échanges au marché. Avec votre autorisation et l’autorisation des officiers et chefs de tribus, nous allons également voyager aux communes autour de Gao. Son numéro de téléphone est 623.22.87.

J’ai des contacts à Gao et Bamako. M. Abal ag Intagaratena, le Président des artisanats à Gao, est mon deuxième contact. Son numéro de téléphone est 948.89.50. M. Mamadou Camera est mon contact à Bamako. Il travaille à la Présidence de la République Commissariat à la Sécurité Alimentaire et ses numéros sont 638.85.30 et 680.99.55.

Si vous avez des soucis, veuillez me contacter par émail :

M. Franklin Graham
Étudiant au Doctorat
Département de la Géographie
P.O. Box 6300
West Virginia University
Morgantown, West Virginia 26506-6300
U.S.A.
Télé: 304.293.5603 x 4323
Émail: fgraham1@mix.wvu.edu

Merci pour votre compréhension et coopération.

Tuareg Identity

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Tue, 24 Oct 2006 19:43:00 +0000

I will be submitting either a summary of my findings in Kidal or the paper I will deliver at the 17th Sahel Workshop, taking place in Grève, Denmark the 6th-7th of November, 2006 by next week.

Until then, I went to offer an observation, superficial at best. There is a difference in terms of how Malians view their Tamasheq peoples and how the Nigeriens view this group. I have walked around Bamako and Niamey extensively and the reaction that people have to my turban and how I wear it is astonishing. In the mid day heat, I cover my face, like the Tamasheq people do only I learned this from the Moors in Mauritania. When I did this in Bamako, the reaction was not that much different as when I wear the turban as a scarf in the late afternoons and evenings. People were just as friendly.

Niamey, however, turns a cold shoulder to me when I veil my face. I can't help but wonder if their are animosities between the southern groups (Hausa, Djerma, Songhaï) and the northern groups (Tamasheq, Arab and Tubu) who had problems with the government the 1990s, an armed rebellion. Concessions were given to northern peoples with the cease fire, but large numbers of Hausa, Djerma and Songhaï peoples protested these concessions as they gave a chunk of an already small national revenue to people who are barely 5% of the population. There is more than just competition over natural resources. There is competition over finiancial resources as well.

Pictures Can Be Deceiving

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Fri, 13 Oct 2006 14:27:00 +0000

One would assume, at first glance that the harsh dry environment of the northern Sahara claimed the life of this camel. But it has actaully rained quite a bit in Northern Mauritania and in other parts of North and West Africa. If you look closely enough, you will see the border of the roadside where this picture was taken. It is likely a large truck hit the poor creature and rendered it food for the other creatures in the desert.

Though water has brought abundance to the desert this year, it has also brought other problems. Where there is water and an abundance of vegetation, there are also pests. The town of Atar where I served as a Peace Corps Volunteer from 1999-2001, used to take pride in the abscence of mosquitoes. That was not the case when I visited last week. It was impossible to sleep with the numbers that harrassed me throughout the night. Mosquitoes, flies, ticks and other parasites can bring illnesses to animals and make life difficult for pastoralists. There needs to be a balance of just enough rain for pasture for there to be ideal conditions for pastoralists.

Why Do Americans Place Themselves in Such Precarious Situations?

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Thu, 12 Oct 2006 15:00:00 +0000

I had some good fortune today; thanks to a kind and patient NGO worker by the name of Mamadou Camera who works at the Commisariat à la Sécurite Alimentaire in Bamako, Mali. If anyone is intersted in contacting this man, please let me know via e-mail and I will send you his contact information.

If you have been following my pervious postings, you will recorgnize that this is the heart of my research ... food security.

I regret that I did not present myself very well, neverous, sweaty and stinky as I had been packed into a dusty, hell-bound bus for the past three-and-a-half days, and perhaps showing the signs of sleep deprivation and fatigue. But perhaps those things enamoured him to me. Or perhaps it was the phenomena that he and others have been pointing out to me as I explained my mission. In his words, "Vous êtes là; indépendent; n'aucune vous présente pas?" In English, "You are here, alone, without anyone introducing you?"

I waited patiently in his office as there was someone he wanted me to meet who works with USAID and he had his own work to accomplish. But after some time, his attention shifted to me and he began explaining his experiences in Kidal and teaching me some of the Tellalasi Arabic, the dialect that is used in the region. I, in good turn, explained to him some of the Hassaniyya terms and phrases I had learned when I was a Peace Corps volunteer in Atar, Mauritania and we had a few laughs of the differences in the langauges, food people eat and the attitudes that desert peoples have of outsiders.

One observation that he shared with me, that will certainly influence the work that I do in the region is his explanation of who lives in Kidal and how it functions as a society of diversity. There are mostly Bambara people living in the town itself; but the Tamasheq (Tuareg) still maintain the majority in the countryside and mingle with other groups in town during the day. In addition there are groups of Peulh, Arabs and Songhai. The Tamasheq or Kel Adagh (a more specific and perhaps appropriate name for them) have the routine of quitting the town at 18 00 in the evening and marching five kilometers out into the countryside with the families and herds. So if you can imagine a dusty, smelly foolish academic lugging a 20 kg backpack through some deep sand every night starting in mid-November and carrying on until mid-May 2007, then you know what I am up to for the next seven months.

Unfortunately the other man who is working on a USAID project in the Kidal region is not famalir with nor works with pastoralists in the region. He concentrates on the settled peoples, the Bambara, Songhai and others who have given up on or never had an interest in pastoralism. But then, this gives me a chance to return the favor of information and collaboration with this NGO; since I will be working with pastoral communities.

I will leave Bamako for Kidal this Saturday. I look forward to the next person posing the question, "Vous êtes là; indépendent; n'aucune vous présente pas?"

Research Objectives

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Sat, 30 Sep 2006 14:22:00 +0000

My goal in this research to show how forces, both external and internal to West African communities, contribute to problems of food security (en français, la sécurité alimentaire) with pastoralists in northeastern Mali around the provincial capital, Kidal, and in central Niger around the Iferouâne region. Literature since the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s have pointed towards a decline in pastoralism as a livelihood and more as a wage labor activity as more and more pastoralists abandoned the rangelands and adopted other economic activities such as wage labor jobs and farming. Recent literature, however, has suggested resurgence in pastoralism as a livelihood as urban problems and insecurity in wage labor jobs, like mining, have had little appeal to some. Still, returning to flocks and grasslands today is not without its difficulties. The ecology in some regions has altered due to the abandonment of pastures and civil conflicts, and also the establishment of natural reserves and parks has reduced the former commons.

Food procurement strategies are the foci of this research. In the past, pastoralists had a range of strategies during food crises ranging from migrations to other regions, collection of wild foods and hunting to a reliance on social, economic and kinship relations between various groups such as the collection of tithes from sedentary peoples. Investigating the changes in pastoral responses to famine-droughts is important, not only to understand the links pastoral groups have with the other local communities and external agents involved in these crises, but also to provide pastoralists and policy makers effective options to reduce vulnerability to droughts and famine. Future research will analyze how pastoralists have historically procured food, changes in that procurement mechanism, and the forces that have prompted such change, but at first I pose the question as to which trend pastoralists are moving towards, whether it is incorporating more economic activities to cushion against food crises or if it is a return to the rangelands and a re-education of former strategies taken during droughts and famines.

Dodging the bribes to Mali and Niger

noreply@blogger.com (Franklin Graham) — Sun, 24 Sep 2006 17:59:00 +0000

How does one collect receipts from corrupt officials who demand a money/gifts or they will hold on to one's passport or other important documents for an unspecified time?

And then, if you have the receipts, how does one justify it as a necessary expense in doing grant research?

These are things that no one prepares you for but if you have lived in any part of Africa for a significant amount of time, you become accustomed to it and develop your own lines of defense.

I am delayed in making it to Mali and Niger but I am glad to say I have the proper visas now to move on and start my research.

First, a pass through Mauritania and a reunion with a few peolpe I worked with in the past.